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Abstract
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMSCA) stipulates Hours of
Service (HOS) regulations in order to minimize or eliminate fatigued truck driving, a
major cause of truck-related accidents. This research examines the efficacy of HOS with
three unique research approaches: 1) a typology classification model to indicate
differences in HOS regulation from other safety regulations, 2) an exhaustive
enumeration method utilizing the theoretical foundation of perishable inventory theory,
and 3) a statistical analysis on accidents caused by or involving truck drivers. This
research provides insight into similar Air Force Instructions regarding flight-time
restrictions for pilots, which attempt to prevent flying while fatigued. This research
demonstrates that these types of restrictions do not directly measure fatigue and that they
are subject to various unintended consequences.
Classification is a tool that can be used to conceptually understand the differences
in regulations. Using disjointed incrementalism as its theoretical foundation, this
research proposes a new typology, a specific form of classification, and utilizes this
typology to examine a sample of 14 commercial motor vehicle safety regulations
qualitatively and quantitatively. This approach offers explanative insights into preferred
types of regulations as well as predictive insights into how regulations change over time.
This research also utilizes an Exhaustive Enumeration technique in order to find
optimal discrete values for the various different HOS regulations. For example, this
research found that drivers could accumulate 28.6 percent more average daily driving
v

hours in 2012 than in 2014 due to the recent change in HOS regulations. Not only are the
HOS regulations restricting the amount of truck driver hours, but there has also been an
increase in the amount of HOS regulatory changes. Eleven of the 23 HOS regulation
changes have occurred since 2003. This ever-changing regulatory environment has many
safety implications to the truck driving industry. Perishable inventory theory is used to
understand how companies and truck drivers operate within this regulatory environment.
This theoretical foundation provides a unique view on possible unintended consequences
created by some of the recent HOS regulations.
In July 2013, the Federal Motor Safety Carrier Association (FMSCA) revised its
Hours of Service (HOS) regulatory policy, which restricts the number of duty and driving
hours a truck driver can operate. The revision changed the unlimited restart provision by
restricting it to 1 restart per 168 hours (1 week) and added that the restart must span two
consecutive 1 am to 5 am periods. Lawmakers suspended these two aspects of the restart
provision in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations act on December
16, 2014 until more analysis was completed on the efficacy of these regulations due to
unintended consequences that allegedly negatively affected motorist’s safety. Countering
truck driver fatigue is an important issue and an extremely difficult task because of the
many confounding aspects that can cause fatigue. The new regulation set forth in July
2013, was supposed to lessen fatigue and thus reduce accidents caused by truck drivers.
The current HOS regulation was in place for approximately 16 months, producing
enough data for a statistical analysis of its effects on truck driver safety. This research
found that by comparing truck driving safety data prior to the change in July of 2013 (the
unlimited restart provision) to truck driving safety data during the enactment of the 1
vi

restart per 168-hour restriction and 1 am to 5 am provision, the percent of accidents
caused by truck drivers did not decrease. Furthermore, this research found that the HOS
changes implemented on July 1, 2013 have not led to a change in the continuing
downward trend in accidents involved and caused by truck drivers. These results suggest
that other factors appear to be linked to motorists’ safety, rather than the updated HOS
regulation.
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EXAMINATION OF COMMERCIAL MOTOR VEHICLE HOURS OF SERVICE SAFETY
REGULATION
I. Introduction
Background
Although trucks are one of five main modes of logistics (air, maritime, rail, and pipelines
being the others), they interface with logistics more than any mode. In fact, 81.9% (ATA 2011)
in terms of value and 60.1% of volume of U.S. domestic goods are shipped with trucks (Dobbins,
2007). Trucks are critical to the shipment and movement of goods mainly in part due to the
flexibility they provide. This flexibility is the result of the vast availability of roads, as well as
the large number of trucks and truck drivers. There are approximately 3.5 million truck drivers
and 26.4 million trucks registered (ATA 2016), and about 1 of 15 workers in the country are
employed in some aspect of the trucking industry (All Trucking 2016).
The truck industry is vital to the US economy, and if the truck driving industry is
restricted, it will have great impacts to the economy and to our society. For example, trucks are
primarily responsible for moving goods for the food industry, and if trucks were halted for a
mere three days there would be food shortages across the country (McKinnon 2006).
While trucks are important for delivering goods, they are also responsible for accidents
involving other motorists. Accidents involving trucks occur more often when truck drivers have
been awake or on duty for long periods (Soccolich et al. 2013; Hanowski et al. 2007; Jovanis et
al. 2011; Braver et al. 1999). This safety concern brings about legislation that restricts the truck
driver’s duty and driving time. Balancing safety (through restricting truck driver’s hours of
operation) and maximizing the logistical capacity of trucks and truck drivers is a challenge.
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There have been both economic and safety regulations in the truck industry. Hours of
service (HOS) is one of the safety regulations and is the focus of this research HOS restricts the
number of hours that a truck driver can operate as well as mandate the number of off-hours prior
to coming back on duty in order to reduce fatigue and accidents involving trucks. Pritchard
(2010) found that there are about 5,000 fatal crashes involving trucks per year resulting in social
costs greater than 32 billion dollars. Many of these accidents have been caused by fatigued truck
drivers, which may have been prevented with proper rest and truck driver awareness (Quan et al.
2015). The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMSCA) has instituted measures that
restrict the driving and duty hours of truck drivers to promote safety and minimize any negative
economic impact on the commercial motor vehicle industry.
Research has demonstrated how fatigue leads to increased accident rates by decreasing
reaction time, disorientation while driving, and overall impaired performance (Williamson et al.
2011; Min 2009a). The majority of research has examined the factors that lead to fatigue.
Research has found an increase in accident rates involving trucks from 50 percent to 200 percent
in the 10th and 11th hour; and statistically significant accident rates after the 8th hour (Abrams et
al. 1997; Hanowski et al. 2011; Kaneko & Jovanis 1992; Jovanis et al. 2011). Research has also
found contributing factors to fatigue and accident rates such as the number of breaks and break
duration (Blanco, Hanowski & Olson 2011; Chen & Xie 2014b), sleep habits (Gander et al.
2006), carrier scheduling practices (M. Crum & Morrow 2002), schedule induced practices
(Beilock 1995; Soccolich et al. 2013), cargo type (Retzer et al. 2013), loading and unloading
(Shibuya et al. 2010), obesity and sleep apnea (Anderson et al. 2012), time pressures (Kemp et
al. 2013), long-haul vs short-haul (Friswell & Williamson 2013), age (Summala & Mikkola
1994; Duke et al. 2010), and many other factors that can be seen in both Figure 1 and Figure 2.
18

Ironically, one factor that has not been well researched is the factor that attempts to regulate the
fatigue of truck drivers—HOS regulation.

Figure 1 Factors Affecting Driver Fatigue (Min, 2009)

Figure 2 Potential Endogenous and Exogenous Factors on Fatigue (L. Di Militia et al., 2011)

19

Although it is clear that driver fatigue is dangerous and has been linked to higher accident
rates (Dinges 1995; Mackie & Miller 1978; Williamson & Friswell 2013; Summala & Mikkola
1994; Zhu & Srinivasan 2011), the effectiveness of HOS regulatory policy on reducing fatigue
and making roads safer is still unclear (Arnold et al. 1997; Min 2009b). Research has found that
many drivers actually begin their driving periods fatigued, indicating that HOS may restrict the
number of operating hours but does not directly reduce fatigue or ensure alert truck drivers
(Abrams et al. 1997). It is also possible that HOS has resulted in less safety for truck drivers
and motorists.
HOS may have unintended consequences. As an example, research found that HOS
safety regulation increased congestion at peak times putting both motorists and truck drivers at
more risk (Dingus et al. 2006; Downs 1992; Bucklew 2011; Ferro 2014; FMSCA 2010).
Similarly HOS provisions may have made motorists less safe due to circadian rhythm swaps
(Ferro 2014), which has been shown to increase fatigue (Abrams et al. 1997; Arnold et al. 1997;
Arrow et al. 1996; Sando et al. 2010). Research has also found that 14 percent of truck drivers
were found to avoid known check stations (deviating from their route by up to 160 miles)
thereby driving on less-safe rural roads (Taylor et al., 2000).
Although scarce, there are examples in western civilizations that contrast the difference
between regulated and unregulated states providing further evidence for the previous arguments.
Arnold et al. (1997) discussed unregulated drivers in Australia while Williamson et al. (1992)
discussed regulated drivers in Australia. Comparing these two articles provided an interesting
perspective regarding the potential problems with HOS regulations in Australia (see Table 1).
These differences suggests that regulations result in less sleep to drivers, more traffic to society,
higher perceptions of fatigue, longer working hours at varying times of the day, and a higher
20

incident of drug use. These results were also confirmed by Dingus et al., (2006), who found that
unregulated drivers (Intra- versus Inter-state) slept more than regulated drivers did.

Table 1 Regulated versus Unregulated Drivers in Australia

Arnold et al. Williamson et al.
Unregulated
Regulated
Prior Night of Sleep Before Journey
8.25
7.5
Perceive fatigue is an issue for themselves
10%
28% to 35%
Perceive fatigue is an issue for the industry
39%
78%
Coontributions to fatigue
Heavy City Traffic
Loading Unloading as a problem with fatigue
33%
47%
Driving at dawn causing fatigue
21%
56%
Long driving hours cause fatigue
38%
49%
Lack of sleep during the trip
40%
32%
Drugs
16%
32%

More recently and in the U.S., there have been conflicting claims about the effectiveness
of recent HOS regulation changes. Some trucking unions and some members of Congress have
claimed negative safety implications due to prolonged traffic congestion during daytime hours
and increased fatigue (Ferro 2014; Short 2013). Conversely, legislative branch members and
research has claimed that the HOS revision has decreased accidents, reduced damage, and most
importantly, saved lives (Ferro 2014; Chen et al. 2015; FMSCA 2010).
Since there is little research regarding the HOS regulations as a possible factor
contributing to fatigue and other possible negative safety implications, this research attempts to
fill this gap. This research provides three different approaches to understanding HOS regulatory
impact on safety.
21

This research approaches this complex problem by researching three main topics (see
Figure 3). First, the regulation is inherently indirect in its approach because it does not target
fatigue but rather duty hours. Second, as the regulation changes it alters the hours and capacity
of truck drivers dramatically, creating many other possible unintended incentives. Third, since it
is an indirect policy and incentives may change, it is possible that there will be unknown safety
consequences from this policy--shown as unintended consequences.

Figure 3 Hours of Service Safety Construct

To elaborate more on the first point, HOS does not directly manage fatigue of truck
drivers. Therefore, it is entirely possible that a truck driver follows the rules but still violates the
intent of the law. This information is not new, but has not changed this regulation from
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indirectly managing fatigue. An example is a FMSCA (2000) report quotes an ICC official who
objected to the proposed HOS regulation in 1937:
We have no control over the manner in which a driver may spend his time off-duty,
although some of his spare time activities may tire him as much as any work would do.
We can only emphasize, by this comment, the responsibility which is the driver's own to
assure himself of adequate rest and sleep, in the time available for this purpose, to ensure
safety of his driving, and likewise the employer's responsibility to see that his drivers
report for work in fit condition (ICC, 1937).
This quote reveals that HOS is only looking at one factor that relates to fatigue. This
implies that this regulation may be very different from other safety regulations in the trucking
industry. Thus, the first paper, or chapter 2 of this dissertation, attempts to understand how HOS
is different from the other regulations by creating, utilizing, and empirically testing a typology
classification construct.
To further expand on the second point; changes in HOS regulations restrict or increase
capacity for truck drivers. Restricting or increasing the number of hours a truck driver can
operate will have corresponding logistical impacts to a lean supply chain. The number of truck
drivers, tractors, distribution centers, the amount of inventory needed for a given service level
are only but a few of the possible changes that may occur to the supply chain. It is important to
understand the complex changes that can occur to the supply chain and the truck driving industry
when HOS regulations are modified. This is accomplished in paper 2, or chapter 3 of this
dissertation, which details how perishable inventory theory and its associated tactics can be used
to understand the complex safety consequences of an ever-changing HOS regulatory body.
The third point of this dissertation is to determine if this regulation has increased safety
or decreased safety for truck drivers and motorists. This is a difficult problem due to the dates of
the HOS changes not coinciding with the annual data, and reports indicating if the motorist or
23

truck driver was at fault. In order to overcome these obstacles, data was used from an Ohio
database. From this data, it was possible to discover the number of accidents involving and
caused by truck drivers regarding property damage, injury, and fatal accidents. Utilizing
regression, parametric, and nonparametric techniques, this research was able to examine the
safety efficacy of HOS in Ohio. The Ohio data was also extrapolated to provide for an analysis
on truck driver safety in the U.S. From this extrapolation, more information was revealed
regarding the accuracy of FMSCA’s predictions.
The last chapter of this dissertation provides concluding remarks regarding this research.
It will also provide the contributions from this research, and possible implications to the
Department of Defense (DoD).
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II. A Typology Classification Approach to Exploring Differences in Commercial Motor
Vehicle Safety Regulations
Abstract
Classification is a tool that can be used to conceptually understand the differences in
regulations. Using disjointed incrementalism as its theoretical foundation, this research proposes
a new typology, a specific form of classification, and utilizes this typology to statistically
examine a sample of 14 commercial motor vehicle safety regulations. This approach offers
explanative insights into preferred types of regulations as well as predictive insights into how
regulations change over time.

Introduction
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMSCA) is charged with regulating
the safety of the commercial motor vehicle (CMV) or trucking industry. Safety regulations
governing the CMV industry have existed since the publication of the first code of federal
regulation in 1938. Safety regulations include hours of service (HOS), which stipulates the
driving and duty time limits for truck drivers.
HOS has changed frequently since 2000 creating a discussion involving legislators,
researchers, and the trucking industry regarding what regulations are needed to prevent fatiguerelated accidents. This research does not attempt to provide an optimal regulation for HOS or
the factors that may lead to fatigued truck drivers, but rather uses a classification methodology to
understand differences in the HOS safety regulation from other CMV safety regulations.
This research provides a descriptive, explanative, and predictive model for regulation
types. Each regulation has unique characteristics that can be classified into a two-by-two
25

typology representing four types of regulation. These types of regulations are: 1) subjectivedirect, 2) subjective-indirect, 3) objective-direct, and 4) objective-indirect. Classifying
regulations into this conceptual model enables a descriptive comparative analysis of regulation
types.
Since a specific regulation changes over time and those changes are generally viewed as
improvements, it follows that the change in associated classification type would also be viewed
as an improvement. Thus, type changes help explain the type most suitable for a specific
regulation at a specific time.
This research also provides predictive power to the eventual type of a regulation given its
initial type classification. A predictive model is created by analyzing how a change in a
regulation can potentially lead to changes in the classification type.
Each classification type has associated characteristics. The characteristics of the
regulation type are 1) character count, 2) section count, and 3) time between changes. The
conceptual model can therefore be validated empirically by utilizing parametric and nonparametric testing techniques to test for differences in characteristics among each type.
To better understand regulation changes over time, the theory of disjointed
incrementalism is introduced. This theory underscores that regulation change occurs
incrementally due to political feasibility, and occurs disjointedly due to decision-makers’
constraints of time, analytical ability, and fragmented goals (Lindblom 1959).
This research is broken down into five sections. The literature review details previous
research in the field of classification. The methodology and analysis sections discuss the clear
and repeatable analysis used in this research. A discussion of the results and possible future
research directions concludes the article.
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Literature Review
Creation of Typology Classification
The classification of policy provides a theoretical framework needed to better partition
differences in policy creation and implementation. This framework enables organization and
linkage to predictable patterns of policy and implementation in regards to the expected political
and social behaviors that may arise (Smith 2002; Schneider & Sidney 2009). Mitchell et al.
illustrate that classification is a critical prerequisite for understanding the lineage of decisions
regarding policy (1985). They also suggest meaningful hypotheses can come from segmenting
government policies, leading to conclusions on policy performance. They conclude that the
classification of policy does not lead to successful policy, but that it is a prerequisite for it.
Classification is the foundation for language, speech, math, data analysis and the
understanding of concepts (Bailey 1994). For instance, the concept of a vegetable begins and
ends with the classification of similar or dissimilar ideas (Bailey, 1994). This classification
process can also be used for policies implemented by the government, which have the ability to
affect the human race for generations (Schneider & Sidney 2009).
Classification of policy is not only important but also challenging (Smith 2002; Lowi
1972; Bailey 1994; Schneider & Ingram 1997; DeLeo 2015; Lowi 1964; Anderson 1997;
Drescher et al. 2011) for numerous reasons. Three of these reasons are: 1) dimension scaling, 2)
ensuring homogeneity within the policy type and heterogeneity amongst the policy types, and 3)
clear definitions for classification (Bailey 1994; Kluge 2000).
Dimension scaling is necessary due to the exponential number of policy types that can be
created. For example, a four dichotomous typology has 24 or 16 types and a four trichotomous
typology would have 34 or 81 types. More types may create clearer differences and
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heterogeneity amongst the types, however the model’s complexity may lose usefulness due to its
complexity (Bailey 1994).
Creating a simple typology may provide a useful conceptual and descriptive model as
long as its types can be clearly differentiated. Homogeneity within the type and heterogeneity
among the types creates the most useful typology but requires specific and repeatable
classification techniques (Kluge 2000; Barton 1955).
Smith (2002) discussed that a typological approach can be powerful but prone to
classification error and therefore not repeatable. He discusses how loose definitions regarding
subjective classifications are one of the most common errors within classification research that
leads to questionable and non-repeatable results.
Policy and Regulatory Design
Research regarding classification of policy types and creation of typologies within the
field of CMV policy does not exist, based on the literature search. However, there is a plethora
of research within the social sciences that can be drawn from to bridge this research gap in the
CMV policy field.
In policy design, Schneider and Sidney (2009) suggest the first step is the problem
definition and goals to be pursued. The goal of the regulation may be straightforward, but the
implementation of the policy may not be because of the inability to measure the goal—leading to
an indirect policy. For example, the HOS regulation intends to eliminate driving while fatigued
(Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 2016); however, the regulation only restricts the
duty and driving time, which have been shown to be factors in fatigued driving (Brown 1986;
Torregroza-Vargas et al. 2014; Williamson et al. 1992; Williamson et al. 2011); but there are
also many other factors that contribute to truck driver fatigue. A few of these fatigue factors that
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are not regulated by HOS are: multi-day driving patterns (Kaneko & Jovanis 1992); starting
fatigue level (M. R. Crum & Morrow 2002); driving time of day (Blower & Campbell 1998);
miles driven (Lyman & Braver 2003; Joshua & Garber 1990; Jovanis & Chang 1986); truck
driver health (Anderson et al. 2012; Stoohs et al. 1994), traffic congestion (Taylor & Dorn 2006);
truck driver obesity (Anderson et al. 2012; Stoohs et al. 1994); distracted driving (Olson et al.
2009; Hanowski et al. 2005); stress, health and narcotics (Taylor & Dorn 2006; Hartley &
Hassani 1994; Crouch et al. 1993); scheduling (M. R. Crum & Morrow 2002; Min 2009b); and
attitudes (Douglas & Swartz 2009). Thus, HOS may have different results than other safety
regulations because it is not directly regulating or measuring fatigue.
Schane (2002) examines the legal words found in laws and finds that some are not always
clear; leading to the law being understood in more than one way. Veenhoven (2002) discusses
these vague or subjective words and their importance in social policy. Objective measures focus
on the facts while subjective measures on the soft facts. He states that subjective indicators
enable a subjective measurement and may require change for clarity. However, subjective
measures can sometimes provide the regulations’ intent or goal, while objective measures tend to
be more myopic by looking at sum-scores. The combination of both subjective and objective
regulations may lead to a more comprehensive regulation that can be objectively enforced by
numbers and clear guidelines, while also providing the goal or intent of the regulation.
Disjointed Incrementalism
The theory of disjointed incrementalism gives emphasis to the capacity of legislatures,
their method, and the eventual acceptance of policy (Lindblom 1959). The first point, that this
theory suggests, is that the capacity of legislators is limited mainly due to time constraints and
limited expertise. These limitations can lead to disjointed policy. The next main point from this
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theory is the method by which policy is created, which emphasizes the disjointed and
incremental aspect. Generally, when there are agreed upon values, the ends justify the means.
When there are conflicting values (which occurs due to special interests groups, concerned
citizens, and legislatures), the means and ends are simultaneous chosen for expediency and
compromise. This method may lead to disjointed policy through exemptions and other aspects
of the regulation and incremental changes in policy, which meet the aspirations of society and
legislators constituents while minimizing political risk.

Method
The first part of the methodology details the conceptual model (typology) that was
created. Dimension scaling was accomplished to keep the typology simple (Bailey 1994). Two
monothetic dimensions were used to create a fourfold typology. The four types are subjectivedirect, subjective-indirect, objective-direct, and objective-indirect. Subjective and objective
were chosen due to the prevalence of ambiguity and misunderstandings that occur in laws and
regulations (Schane 2002). The dimension of direct and indirect were used due to the varying
level of agreement that sometimes exist between the means (regulation) and ends (goals) of the
regulation (Montgomery 1990; Nicoletti & Scarpetta 2003; Lindblom 1959).
Bailey (1994) stated that the secret to classification is the ability to ascertain and
differentiate the fundamental characteristics of the phenomenon studied. In our research, the
clear and comprehensive definitions were critical to the success of this research and were
developed after consulting with a lawyer, a compliance manager, and other researchers. The
definitions utilized for this research are as follows:
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•
•

•

•

Objective: The typical prudent person would understand this rule and know with
reasonable certainty when a situation was in or out of compliance with the stated rule.
- Example: Drive no faster than 45 mph
Subjective: Discretion and interpretation is required to act in accordance with this rule.
The typical prudent person would have trouble clearly classifying whether a specific
situation was in or out of compliance. Frequently, reasonable arguments could be made
in support of either compliance or noncompliance for a given scenario.
- Example: Drive safely
Direct: What is governed, measured, or stipulated by the rule is highly correlated with
the desired or undesired behavior. Disobeying the rule naturally and consistently leads to
predictably unfavorable outcomes regarding the regulation’s desired goal.
- Example: No drinking of alcohol 10 hours before or while operating a vehicle
(Direct because the regulation is restricting the direct act of being under the
influence of alcohol)
Indirect: What is governed, measured, or stipulated by the rule may or may not be
unequivocally correlated with the desired or undesired behavior. A prudent person can
cite plausible and common scenarios in which following the rule will not lead to the
desired outcome.
- Example: No going to a bar before or while on duty (Indirect, because the
regulation is restricting a behavior that may or may not lead to being under the
influence of alcohol)
Certain assumptions are also needed in order to classify these regulations. First, this

research assumes that some regulations are not fully comprehensive or exhaustive and a
classification of a regulation does not depend on whether the regulation captures every possible
scenario. Second, this research assumes that the numbers or limits stipulated by the regulations
are correct. This research does not argue whether .04-blood alcohol content (BAC) is the right
value, but rather whether a value is provided and understood. Third, this research assumes that
some regulations may require a capability of enforcement that is not likely to occur due to
limitations of enforcing agents.
Hein Online was the primary instrument used to collect the data on the regulations.
Regulations were digitally captured for the period of 1938 to 2016, which corresponds to the
beginning of regulations on the commercial motor vehicle (CMV) industry. The Code of Federal
Regulations (CFRs) and list of sections affected were used to capture the dates and associated
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regulation changes. Due to title number changes and limitations on CFRs before 1961, the
Federal Register (FR) was also searched for any final ruling on the specific regulation. The FR
also provided relevant information and discussion during the hearing or changing of the
regulation that aided in the rationale for the regulatory change.
Fourteen different CMV safety regulations were chosen from dissimilar CFR parts under
title 49 in order to gather a wide variety of regulations to analyze. The 14 regulations dealt with
the following issues 1) Brake Performance, 2) Sleeper Berth, 3) Inspection, Repair, and
Maintenance, 4) Tires, 5) Hazardous Conditions, 6) Alcohol Prohibition, 7) Ill or Fatigued
Drivers, 8) Necessary Driving Knowledge and Compliance of the Regulations, 9) Needed Skill
and Experience, 10) Drugs and Other Substances, 11) Hearing Requirements, 12) Eyesight
Requirements, 13) HOS, and 14) Safe Loading Procedures. Any associated change to these
regulations or subparts of these regulations were documented. Documenting this data enabled an
analysis of the level of change (substantial or non-substantial), the character and section count
involved the change, the date of the change, and the reason for the change (if available).
Non-substantial changes were based on minor modifications to references, titles, or parts
of the regulation. An examples of these non-substantive changes include changing him to
him/her or the driver, and “motor vehicle” to “commercial motor vehicle driver” (Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration 1995). Substantial changes occurred when the regulation added or
deleted sections, or changed wording.
The initial regulation and any associated substantial changes were provided to four
logistics doctoral students for classification. Based on the results of this pretest, minor revisions
were made to the definitions, instructions, and formatting prior to giving it to the classification
team.
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The specific regulations and the chronological changes were provided to four academics
on the classification team. The team classified 275 changes that occurred in the 14 regulations
between 1938 and 2016. The change in part of the regulation as well as the entire regulation was
classified based on the definitions provided. To assess inter-rater reliability, pairwise percent
agreements and Cohen’s Kappa statistics were calculated (Fleiss 1973; Cohen-Mansfield &
Werner 1997). Kappa values range from 0 to 1 with the closer to 1 indicating a closer agreement
of classification types from the team (Fleiss 1973).
After the team classified the regulation and the subparts of the regulation into the specific
types, a statistical analysis was completed. Measurements including the mean time a regulation
stayed a certain type; the probability of a regulation changing from one type to a different type;
and if information was available, the circumstances that led to the change in the regulation was
analyzed.
An empirical analysis was also conducted after the regulations were classified into types
in order to strengthen this typology construct. The characteristics of the typology that were used
were character count, growth in both characters and sections over time, number of substantial
changes, and probability of change to a different type. To examine differences between types,
averages, standard errors and deviations, and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) testing was
conducted followed by the post-hoc Fisher’s Least Significant Difference (LSD) pairwise
comparison. ANOVA parametric assumptions were met for character and section count, which
assessed normality using the Shapiro-Wilks test (Razali & Wah 2011); constant variance was
assessed using the Bartlett test (Levene 1960); and independence by time was assessed via the
Durbin-Watson test (Kanlayasiri & Boonmung 2007). However, for number of substantial
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changes, parametric assumptions were not met. Consequently, non-parametric tests were
conducted using the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test (Hollander et al. 2013).

Analysis
The Cohen’s Kappa value regarding the inter-rater reliability of the classification of
regulation into specific types was 0.8 with an average pairwise agreement of 86.5 percent. This
kappa value falls at the top of the substantial agreement range and just shy of almost perfect
agreement (Landis & Koch 1977).
Of the regulations that existed in 1938, 11 were classified initially as subjective-direct, 1
as objective-direct, 2 as not existent yet (--), and 1 as objective-indirect (see Table 2). The
objective percent and direct percent are shown for each regulation. A general trend was that each
regulation became more objective over time. The number of sections and characters is listed
underneath the percentages and provides information about the size of the regulation changes.
The general trend with regulation size was an increase in character count and sections, which
was correlated with the shift to more objective regulation types. Of the regulations that began as
subjective-direct, nine became objective-direct and four ended as subjective-direct. The two
regulations that began as objective-direct remained that type. Hours of service regulation was
the only regulation classified as objective-indirect and it remained this type.
Overall movement of regulation types are shown in Figure 4. Subjective-direct
regulations had a 71.5% chance of staying subjective-direct upon a substantial change to the
regulation and a 28.5% chance of changing type to objective-direct. Subjective-direct regulatory
types changed at a rate of 23.5 years and a standard deviation of 13.8 years. This type changed to
an objective-direct type at a rate of 28.7 years with a standard deviation of 5.3 years. Objective34

direct regulation types changed at a rate of 19.5 years and a standard deviation of 12.2 years.
Indirect-objective regulation types changed at a rate of 7.09 years and a standard deviation of 7
years.
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Table 2: Regulation by Year Objective / Direct Percent and Characteristic (Section count, Character count)
Date
1938
1940
1950
1960
CFR
1
3
15
25
Brake
63%/100% 75%/100% 75%/100% 63%/100%
Performance
(3,853)
(3,1199)
(3,1223)
(3,971)
70%/78%
Sleeper Berth
---(12,3852)
Equipment
%/100%
%/100%
71%/79%
-Inspection
(2,206)
(2,206)
(6,1414)
25%/75% 25%/75% 25%/75% 33%/100%
Tires
(2,199)
(2,207)
(2,207)
(4,919)
Cargo
0%/100% 0%/100% 0%/100% 0%/100%
Inspection
(2,199)
(2,207)
(2,207)
(4,919)
Hazardous
0%/100% 0%/100% 0%/100% 0%/100%
Conditions
(2,293)
(2,326)
(2,326)
(2,326)
Impaired
0%/100% 0%/100% 0%/100% 0%/100%
Driving
(2,461)
(2,474)
(2,465)
(2,465)
0%/75%
0%/75%
0%/75%
0%/75%
Knowledge
(2,358)
(2,334)
(2,335)
(2,335)
13%/100% 13%/100% 13%/100% 13%/100%
Experience
(3,303)
(3,329)
(2,324)
(2,324)
25%/75% 25%/75% 25%/75% 25%/75%
Narcotics
(2,79)
(2,166)
(2,159)
(2,159)
25%/100% 25%/100% 25%/100% 25%/100%
Alcohol
(2,186)
(2,247)
(2,247)
(2,247)
0%/100% 0%/100% 0%/100% 0%/100%
Hearing
(2,35)
(2,35)
(2,35)
(2,35)
0%/100% 100%/100% 100%/100% 100%/100%
Eyesight
(1,151)
(1,292)
(1,292)
(1,292)
100%/0% 100%/0% 100%/0% 100%/0%
HOS
(4,1185)
(4,1363)
(3,2596)
(3,2596)

1970
35

1980
45

1990
55

2000
65

2010
75

2016
81

100%/100% 100%/100% 100%/100% 100%/100% 100%/100% 100%/100%
(6,954)
(10,1617)
(10,1617)
(10,1617)
(11,2240)
(11,2240)
70%/78%
62%/78%
62%/78%
62%/78%
62%/78%
62%/78%
(12,3983)
(20,3716)
(21,3571)
(21,3571)
(21,3571)
(21,3570)
71%/79%
77%/91%
77%/86%
77%/82%
75%/84%
75%/84%
(7,1447)
(12,1909)
(11,1737)
(10,1776)
(10,2003)
(10,2003)
100%/100% 92%/98%
93%/93%
94%/94%
93%/94%
93%/94%
(6,915)
(14,2494)
(16,3016)
(17,1821)
(18,3191)
(18,3191)
17%/100%
48%/98%
48%/98%
48%/98%
48%/98%
48%/98%
(6,915)
(14,2494)
(16,3016)
(17,1821)
(18,3191)
(18,3191)
0%/100%
0%/100%
0%/100%
0%/100%
0%/100%
0%/100%
(2,668)
(2,668)
(2,668)
(2,725)
(2,725)
(2,728)
0%/100%
0%/100%
0%/100%
0%/100%
0%/100%
0%/100%
(2,459)
(2,643)
(2,643)
(2,708)
(2,708)
(2,709)
0%/100%
89%/100% 89%/100%
0%/100%
0%/100%
0%/100%
(2,187)
(12,3616)
(12,3616)
(2,187)
(2,187)
(2,187)
13%/100%
76%/93%
76%/93%
76%/93%
76%/93%
76%/93%
(4,368)
(20,3386)
(20,3386)
(20,3522)
(20,3522)
(20,3516)
25%/75%
68%/100% 75%/100% 75%/100% 75%/100% 75%/100%
(2,159)
(8,990)
(9,1024)
(9,1045)
(9,1045)
(9,1045)
25%/100%
65%/95%
84%/93%
90%/94%
90%/94%
90%/94%
(2,348)
(8,1009)
(15,2580)
(17,2717)
(17,2735)
(17,2735)
75%/100% 75%/100% 75%/100% 75%/100% 75%/100% 75%/100%
(2,122)
(2,434)
(2,434)
(2,434)
(2,434)
(2,434)
100%/100% 100%/100% 100%/100% 100%/100% 100%/100% 100%/100%
(1,375)
(1,470)
(1,470)
(1,470)
(1,470)
(1,470)
100%/0%
100%/0%
100%/0%
100%/0%
100%/0%
100%/0%
(6,3264)
(8,3424)
(16,2622)
(8,1220)
(7,1117)
(13,2736)

*Blue indicates Subjective-Direct, Yellow indicates Objective-Indirect, White indicates Objective-Direct, -- Not existent yet

Figure 4: Type Movement
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The Federal Register (FR) sometimes provided the rationale for the change in regulation.
Oral hearings and written testimonies were also examined in the FRs to determine the impetus
for the change in regulation type. Upon changing regulatory type, the majority of reasons for the
change were due to three main factors: 1) legal clarity, 2) availability of new technology, 3)
comprehensive regulatory reform (change in standards and or new aspects to regulate). These
reasons for type change are depicted in Figure 4. Although entire regulations did not change
from type indirect to direct, there were sections of the regulation that did change due to legal
clarity and technology. For example, in 1988 a bill was passed to stipulate that blood alcohol
content of drivers not exceed .004, which moved aspects of the overall regulation from indirect
to directly measurement due to the ability to utilize technology (FHWA Docket No. MC-128
1988). Therefore, legal clarity and technology are possibly the catalysts for change in an indirect
to a direct type.
Empirically testing to see if the types are different in the conceptual model is
accomplished by statistically analyzing the type characteristics (time until regulation change,
characters, and sections). The types (objective-direct OD, subjective-direct SD, and objectiveindirect) were significantly different from one another (see Table 3) for characters and sections
(p-value < .0001). Subjective-direct regulations were statistically different from both the
objective-direct (p-value .017) and objective-indirect (p-value .003) regulation types. However,
there was no statistically significant difference between objective-direct and objective-indirect
(p-value of .16) regulation types.
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Table 3 Typology Characteristic Comparison (Character count, Section Counts, Years until Substantial
Change
Objective Direct (OD)
µ
σ
n

Subjective Direct (SD)
µ
σ
n

Objective Indirect (OI)
µ
σ
n

Comparison
(P-Value)

1866.7

1235.6

553

637.5

623.7

439

2432.0

826.0

79

OI>OD>SD
(<.0001)

Section Count

9.9

6.6

553

3.5

3.5

439

7.25

3.7

79

OD>OI>SD
(<.0001)

Years Until
Substantial Change

14.4

15.3

43

23.5

13.7

25

7.8

7.0

11

SD>OD (.017),
SD>OI (.003)

Character Count

Discussion and Conclusion
The conceptual typology model created provides the ability to further differentiate
regulations. Although this study does not discuss the efficacy of these different types of
regulations, it can be assumed that based on the changes in regulation type there are more
preferred or effective types of regulation. If a change occurred, subjective-direct regulation types
moved to objective-direct 28.5 percent of the time, and only moved back 3 percent of the time
(due to a unique situation), leading to 7 of the 11 initially subjective-direct type ending as an
objective-direct type. This implies that objective regulations seem to be preferred to subjective
regulations.
One main observation of this research is that the Hours of Service (HOS) is the only
regulation from the sample that began and ended as an indirect type. No regulations moved from
direct to indirect or indirect to direct, but since the majority of regulations are classified as direct
it would seem that this type of regulations is preferred. Since HOS is regulating a factor related
to fatigue but not fatigue itself, it makes more sense why this regulation is continually changed.
This regulation substantially changed on average every 7.09 years. This was significantly more
frequent than subjective-direct (p value .003) type. In the event that a technology came out that
could measure driver fatigue, HOS regulation may become direct. Until that time, it is very
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likely that more HOS regulatory reform will continue in an attempt to indirectly regulate fatigue.
This sentiment was captured in the following ICC commissioner quote of 1937:
We have no control over the manner in which a driver may spend his time offduty, although some of his spare time activities may tire him as much as any work
would do. We can only emphasize, by this comment, the responsibility which is
the driver's own to assure himself of adequate rest and sleep, in the time available
for this purpose, to ensure safety of his driving, and likewise the employer's
responsibility to see that his drivers report for work in fit condition (ICC, 1937).
Another discussion point that this research finds is the duration a type of regulation
remains the same. Subjective-direct regulations types (19.67 years) changed significantly less
frequently than objective-direct types (13.67 years) and objective-indirect types (7.09 years) (see
Table 3). This research found that for most regulations, an objective approach appears to be
preferred over time. However, some subjective regulations did not change types. A possible
explanation for this is a lack of availability of new technology. For example, the hazardous
conditions regulation (392.14) remained completely subjective-direct from 1938 to 2016. This
regulation did not change much from its original form in 1938:
Extreme caution in the operation of motor vehicles shall be exercised under hazardous conditions, such
as snow, ice, sleet, fog, mist, rain, dust, smoke, or any other condition, which adversely affects visibility
or traction, and speed shall be reduced accordingly.

It is possible to make this regulation objective but the technology is not readily available. For
instance, airports use technology to provide very objective and detailed reports regarding the
airport environment such as the runway surface condition (RSC) and the runway visual range
(RVR). Attempting to do this on all roads would be prohibitively expensive and therefore, this
regulation remains subjective. However, aspects of this regulation may begin to become more
objective in the near future due to technologies like Light Detection and Ranging (LIDR), which
may provide objective information about current visibility restrictions due to smoke, fog, rain or
other particulates.
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Another major finding of this research is the statistical difference among the size
(characters, and sections) of the different types of regulation. Of the three types classified in this
research, all were significantly different (p-value <.0001). Subjective regulations were the
smallest, which could be explained by lack of regulation needed to describe intent rather than
enforceable procedures. The objective-indirect type was substantially larger than either
objective-direct or subjective-direct types. Since there are many indirect factors that contribute
to the problem, indirect regulations may naturally grow in size to attempt to control these many
factors.
The theory of disjointed incrementalism has been used to further explore the policy
governing the trucking industry. This research analyzed regulations from the past 80 years to
understand how and why regulations move or change. From this retrospective, longitudinal
research, it seems that regulations change incrementally and disjointedly due to the limited
knowledge, political feasibility and outside influences. For example, exemptions, especially
when studied longitudinally, provide evidence to the disjointed nature of lawmaking. To
illustrate this point, some of the HOS regulation exemptions occurred for agriculture drivers
(1940), oilfield drivers (1963), or drivers in Alaska (1964). Regulations continually grow in size.
Based on the proposed rules, regulations found in the federal register and Table 3, it appears that
regulations grow incrementally based on political feasibility and expediency.
Given the new regulation typology proposed by this research, there is a plethora of future
research needed to either further substantiate it or find its weaknesses in different fields.
Additional research can be conducted on different characteristics of the types discussed in this
research. Some of these include the efficacy of the regulation or rule to see which regulations
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tend to provide better results regarding their intended objective. Other characteristics such as
cost could be explored in order to provide a better cost-benefit of different regulation types.
The implications of this research are far-reaching due to the practical typology created.
Managers, legislators, and government agencies can benefit from understanding the different
classifications while creating or modifying rules and regulations. Creating only subjective rules
may most likely lead to less control and ambiguous policies, while creating objective regulations
may lead to greater control and clearer policies. Indirect policies may lead to more changes over
time and more complex regulations. In creating rules and regulation, it would appear that some
initial subjectivity is needed to provide the intent and goal, while the majority of the regulation
should seek to be objective to provide more legal clarity and to utilize emerging technologies.
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III. Evaluating Hours-of-Service Impact on Truck Driving Capacity and Safety
Implications: An Application of Perishable Inventory Theory
Abstract
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMSCA) stipulates the Hours of Service
(HOS) regulations in order to minimize or eliminate fatigued truck driving, a major cause of
truck-related accidents. This research utilizes an Exhaustive Enumeration technique in order to
find optimal discrete values for the various different HOS regulations. For example, this
research found that drivers could accumulate 28.6 percent more average daily driving hours in
2012 than in 2014 due to the change in HOS regulations that occurred in 2013. Eleven HOS
regulation changes have occurred since 2003. This ever-changing regulatory environment has
many safety implications to the truck driving industry. Perishable inventory theory is introduced
and used to provide the lens to understand how companies and truck drivers operate within this
environment, providing a unique view on possible unintended consequences created by some of
the recent HOS regulations.

Introduction
Historically, fatal accidents involving truck drivers have often resulted in heightened
press, public outcry, and motor carrier regulation reform (Jensen & Dahl 2009). For example, in
2005 when a fatigued truck driver struck a high school bus, killing five band members and
injuring many others, the result was increased scrutiny of truck driver time limits, also known as
Hours of Service (HOS) (Plungis & Voreacos 2014).
More recently, in 2014, comedian Tracy Morgan was seriously injured and his friend,
James McNair, was killed in an accident caused by a fatigued truck driver. An investigation
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revealed the truck driver was on duty for nearly 14 hours, the maximum allowed by HOS
regulations. Additionally, the driver had been awake for more than 24 hours, allegedly rendering
him unable to react appropriately (Margolin et al. 2014). This accident was widely publicized in
the press, and the public demanded action (Margolin et al. 2014). Just prior to this accident, the
True Safety Act was anticipated to easily pass in the House of Representatives, which would
have redacted certain controversial HOS provisions. However, some legislators feared that
redacting these provisions would have appeared as a relaxing of the regulations, and therefore, it
was not pursued (Pyke 2014). Over time, as public interest subsided, the True Safety Act
eventually passed. Although it is clear that the truck driver was fatigued, it is possible that
certain HOS regulations are creating some accidents due to the additional stress on truck drivers
that leads to fatigue (Min 2009b), and possibly more fatigue from changing driving times.
The passing of this act mainly concentrated on suspending two of the most controversial
rules of the restart provision (The restart provision allows truck drivers to reset their duty time
log back to 0, as long as certain stipulations are met). Two of the three restart provisions that
were suspended detailed the number of restarts a truck driver could take (limit of 1 restart per
168 hours), and the coinciding time of the restart (must occur over two full consecutive 1 am to 5
am periods). These recent provisions were suspended until future research was conducted.
Due to the many recent HOS changes, questions arise concerning the stability and
effectiveness of the HOS regulations, creating a need for further research and debate on the
issues. Although fatigue has been linked to higher accident rates (Dinges 1995; Mackie & Miller
1978; Williamson & Friswell 2013; Summala & Mikkola 1994; Zhu & Srinivasan 2011), the
effectiveness of HOS regulatory policy on reducing fatigue and making roads safer is still
unclear (Arnold et al. 1997; Min 2009b). Prodigious research has been accomplished regarding
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accidents involving trucks due to fatigue (Morrow & Crum 2004; Abrams et al. 1997; Dingus et
al. 2006); distracted driving (Olson et al. 2009; Hanowski et al. 2005); stress, health and
narcotics (Taylor & Dorn 2006; Hartley & Hassani 1994; Crouch et al. 1993); scheduling (M. R.
Crum & Morrow 2002; Min 2009b); and attitudes (Douglas & Swartz 2009). This dissertation
research incorporates this previous research and builds upon it by using perishable inventory
theory as the theoretical foundation to provide a more comprehensive examination of the
efficacy of HOS governing the perishable product of truck drivers’ time.
Truck drivers’ time has two perishable aspects – deterioration and obsolescence. Truck
drivers’ abilities deteriorate with each passing hour, and they become less safe to navigate the
roadways due to fatigue (Min 2009b). Truck drivers also become temporarily obsolete due to
Hours of Service (HOS) regulations, even though they may be able to drive safely. This occurs
because the regulations stipulate that the driver must stop driving at the end of the given
restrictive period. In both scenarios (deterioration and obsolescence), a truck driver’s time is
perishable; as such, perishable inventory theory and some of its concepts (Nahmias 1974;
Nahmias 1975; Nahmias & Pierskalla 1976; Nahmias 1982) are important to this research and
can be used to better understand the impact of HOS on the trucking industry. Some of the
essential tactics used in perishable inventory theory to maximize the utilization of perishable
goods and services in this research are: 1) long-term plan, 2) flexibility, 3) first-in-first-out
(FIFO) and last-in-last-out (LIFO), 4) capacity, 5) substitution and elimination, and 6)
heterogeneity (Nahmias 1974; Nahmias 1982; Kishore et al. 2011; Fitzsimmons 1985; Siferd et
al. 1992).
As previously stated, HOS regulations have been recently changing. These changes alter
one or all of the previously mentioned perishable inventory tactics; and consequently, have
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different safety implications for truck drivers. For example, if truck drivers operated under the 1
restart per 168 hours restriction and the 1 am to 5 am provision, more capacity (a key perishable
inventory tactic) may be achieved by driving during the day than at night even with significant
congestion. Since research has associated higher accident rates with more congestion (Campbell
1995; Kononov et al. 2008), it is logical that the 1 restart per 168 hours restriction and the 1 am
to 5 am provision, could have negative safety implications for truck drivers.
As another example utilizing a different tactic of perishable inventory theory—flexibility,
suppose a truck driver can only operate 14 hours of duty per day, which is a rolling clock and
starts upon the first duty (FMSCA 2015). If a truck driver wants to take a nap due to a moderate
or severe impairment of the natural circadian rhythm (Grugle 2014), the 14-hour running
restriction may disincentivize the truck driver to rest. This rigid regulation reduces the flexibility
(Jensen & Dahl 2009) and could lead to increased fatigue and greater negative safety
implications for some truck drivers.
In order to understand the implications of HOS on truck driver safety, this research
investigates two aspects of the regulatory environment that can alter the tactics of perishable
inventory theory—the frequency, and the magnitude of regulatory changes. This research is
organized in four main sections: literature review, methodology, analysis, and conclusion. First,
the literature review provides the background regarding HOS history and perishable inventory
theory, creating the link of perishable inventory theory concepts to labor and its applications
within perishable goods and services. Next, the paper will discuss the methodologies used
followed by an analysis and discussion section providing additional insight on how the updated
HOS regulations have changed truck drivers’ ability to provide their perishable service. Lastly,
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this research will suggest future research in this field and conclude with managerial and
regulatory implications.

Literature Review
The literature review is divided into two sections. The first introduces perishable
inventory management and identifies some of the tactics mentioned in research related to
perishability to frame the discussion on possible HOS safety implications on the trucking driving
industry. The second section provides a background on HOS regulations.
Perishable Inventory
This research uses an approach advocated by Raafat (1991) which combines the
perishable inventory theory literature (Nahmias 1982) and the deteriorating goods literature
(Bakker et al. 2012). Both of these bodies of literature discuss tactics that can be used to deal
primarily with tangible goods, whereas the Perishable Asset Revenue Model (PARM) and Yield
Management literatures primarily discuss strategies for optimizing the use of services and labor
(Weatherford & Bodily 1992; Kimes 1989). Even though these different bodies of literature tend
to focus on either goods or services (which can be problematic since there are very few pure
goods or pure services), the tactics used to reach end goals are often very similar. For instance,
both goods and labor are critical aspects to the manufacturing process (Sengupta et al. 2006).
Like inventory, a shortage of labor will produce less of a service or finished good while too
much labor increases overhead and waste (Rogerson 1992; Aghazadeh 2003).
Goyal and Giri (2001) categorize inventory into two main categories: deterioration and
obsolescence. Deterioration denotes a natural degradation and ongoing loss of value or quality
over time. Deterioration occurs in many items such as blood, drugs, and food. Using the correct
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tactics ensures that these items have greater utility (Nahmias 1975). Other items, such as clothes
and computers experience a different problem — obsolescence (Siriruk 2012). Obsolescence is
different from deterioration, because it refers to an instantaneous loss of value without a
corresponding loss of quality. Obsolescence is caused by many reasons, such as changes in
technology or in customer preferences and because of regulations.
Perishable inventory theory submits that goods deteriorate linearly or exponentially over
time, and goods become perishable mainly due to deterioration (Nahmias 1975). Similar to
perishable goods, labor also experiences both types of perishability: deterioration and
obsolescence. For example, a truck driver experiences perishable deterioration through loss of
skills, mainly due to fatigue (Grugle 2014) because subsequent driving hours are associated with
lower performance or utility and lead to an increased risk of an accident (Short & Murray 2014).
On the other hand, regulatory policy can lead to obsolescence due to drivers reaching the
maximum amount of driving or duty hours in a given period. Unlike the permanent
obsolescence of milk, which the U.S. Federal Drug Administration (FDA) prohibits being sold
after the expiration date (although it may still be safe to drink), a truck driver’s obsolescence is
temporary and can be reset through rest. The U.S. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMSCA) prohibits driving after the regulated hours (even though the truck driver may still be
safe to drive). Hence, truck drivers are affected similarly to perishable inventory: they
experience deterioration through natural fatigue, and they are subject to obsolescence due to
regulation.
Properly following certain tactics protects against the aspects of deterioration and
obsolescence of perishable products. These tactics (as shown in Figure 5) are capacity,
substitution and/or elimination, strategic planning, flexibility, FIFO or LIFO, and heterogeneity.
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These tactics were identified from the various bodies of perishability-related literature and are
discussed in more detail in the following sections.

Figure 5 Commonly Used Tactics for Dealing with the Aspects of Perishable Inventory Theory,
Yield Management, and Perishable Asset Revenue Model (PARM)

Although perishable goods and labor have similarities concerning deterioration and
obsolescence, they have one primary difference—labor hours cannot be accumulated or stocked.
They are produced and consumed simultaneously, otherwise known as simultaneity
(Fitzsimmons et al. 2013). Consequently, unused labor becomes instantly obsolete as time
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passes. As a result of this type of obsolescence, two other bodies of literature regarding
perishability are utilized to bridge this gap: Yield Management (Kimes 1989) and the Perishable
Asset Revenue Model (PARM) (Weatherford & Bodily 1992). Unbooked airline seats, empty
hotel rooms, unrented cars, unfilled trucks, unutilized doctors’ and nurses’ time are all examples
of perishable services classified under both yield management and PARM (Weatherford &
Bodily 1992; Kimes 1989). These fields help provide more guidance concerning the tactics used
when obsolescence rapidly occurs. For example, an empty airline seat becomes obsolete the
moment the plane takes off, as does the empty space in a trailer when a truck leaves a docking
station. Similarly, unused labor is instantly lost if it is not productive. One of the main tactics
explored, to deal with rapid obsolescence, is service capacity utilization.
Service capacity utilization is a metric that helps ensure that the service is rendered and
does not become unfulfilled or obsolete (Weatherford & Bodily 1992). Both physical capacity
and labor capacity are inputs into service capacity utilization (Siferd et al. 1992). Within the
trucking industry, physical capacity is the infrastructure needed to conduct operations (truck,
trailers, loading docks, etc.) and labor capacity is the operator of the equipment (truck driver).
Optimizing profits occurs from correctly pairing the right amount of physical capacity and labor
capacity (Siferd et al. 1992). HOS regulations dictate the duration of driving or duty time truck
drivers can operate, and when these regulations change so does labor capacity and the optimal
service capacity utilization. Thus, service capacity utilization may be an important tactic for
understanding the impact of HOS on truck drivers’ perishable time.
Fitzsimmons (1985) discusses the concepts of service capacity utilization that are
appropriate for service professions such physicians; noting the permanent loss to the service
provider when physicians are idle. He also discussed how to increase the utilization of
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physicians’ time through elimination or substitution. Elimination involves completely removing
non-value-added aspects from physicians’ workloads, whereas substitution involves shifting
activities to lower-level staff within the medical organization. Shifting activities (substitution)
such as filling out paperwork or prescreening to lower-level staff directly increases the utilization
of the physicians’ skill set (Jo Bitner et al. 1997; Fitzsimmons 1985). Furthermore, the more
valuable or time-restricted the perishable service is, the more elimination of non-value-added
activities and substitutions should occur. As an example of elimination, GPS provides better
routes and aids in finding rest stops, which decreases navigation time and eliminates non-valueadded time for drivers. Substitution, for instance, can be accomplished when fleet managers
provide schedules to drivers, expedite loading/unloading, and manage maintenance times –
ensuring minimal driver downtime. Suitably, the tactics of substitution and elimination may be
critical for understanding the impact of HOS on the perishable time of truck drivers.
Having a plan is an important part of being able to carry out the tactics of elimination or
substitution. Amorim et al. (2012) advocate the importance of a longer-term plan versus
reactively dealing with the current problems of perishable goods. Perishable items can falsely
necessitate action. Because the perishable items lose value and ultimately become a liability,
focusing solely on the present can lead to greater losses through the replication of the same
problems in future time periods (Amorim et al., 2012). Planning often results in better
scheduling. Siferd et al. (1992) emphasized the importance of scheduling strategies to managers
in service capacity planning. Truck companies must optimize profits by balancing the number of
drivers and tractors needed to fulfill demand. When HOS changes, so do the workable hours for
drivers thus, necessitating a change in the number of truck drivers in order to sustain the same
service level (Holcomb et al. 2014; Min 2009b). A look at planning-related investments made
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by trucking companies may enable a better perspective of HOS regulation impact on the truck
driving industry.
A good plan needs to allow flexibility to account for unknowns (Kishore et al. 2011)
especially with regards to perishable goods (Roy, Kar, & Maiti, 2010). While planning truck
drivers’ perishable time, managers should consider providing flexibility to their drivers to
account for breaks, construction and congestion delays, longer than expected unload or upload
times, and breakdown of equipment; otherwise, a decrease in overall service level is more likely
(M. R. Crum & Morrow 2002; Adams-Guppy & Guppy 2003). HOS regulations limit the
flexibility of drivers, which has sometimes led to decreased safety (Jensen & Dahl 2009).
Flexibility, correspondingly, is perhaps an important tactic for improving the overall service
level of truck drivers and for understanding the safety implications of HOS regulations on truck
drivers.
First- in-first out (FIFO) and last-in-first out (LIFO) are two different strategies employed
in perishable inventory theory (Nahmias 1982). Using the oldest units first, (FIFO) minimizes
the expected obsolescence, but increases the average age of the product, while conversely, using
newer units first (LIFO) decreases the average age of the products being delivered, while often
leading to more obsolescence (Nahmias 1982). Let us use two drivers as an example. Driver 1
has already accumulated driving hours, while Driver 2 has not driven in the current time period.
As a long route becomes available, a LIFO approach would use Driver 2 because Driver 1 does
not have enough HOS time remaining to complete the route. For a shorter route, a FIFO
approach could utilize the remaining HOS of Driver 1, ensuring non-obsolescence, thus saving
Driver 2 for future routes. Therefore, the tactics of FIFO and LIFO can be used in realizing
greater utility of truck drivers.
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When dealing with perishable goods, managers need to be aware that not all of the goods
deteriorate at the same rate or become obsolete at the same time. This is the concept of
heterogeneity. Heterogeneous products that have not expired are not of equal utility or value
(Nahmias 1982). Truck drivers should be considered heterogeneous because they do not have
the same capability to manage their fatigue; thus they deteriorate at different rates. Obesity, age,
and overall health are some of the factors that increase driver fatigue (McCartt et al. 2000;
FMSCA 2015). For example, Stoohs et al. (1994) showed that obese truck drivers were twice as
likely to have an accident as non-obese drivers. Research has also found that younger drivers
(Summala & Mikkola 1994; Horne & Burley 2010), and older drivers (Wang & McDonald 2004;
Mitler et al. 1997; McGwin Jr & Brown 1999) are associated with deteriorated skills due to
fatigue. In essence, truck drivers’ time cards or Electronic on Board Recorders (EOBR) may be
the same, but they may offer different performance levels of service and safety.
Correspondingly, heterogeneity can be used to understand the possible HOS implications on
truck drivers’ perishable time.
Perishable goods are categorized as one of the most difficult inventory problems due to
their limited life, loss of revenue due to deterioration and obsolescence, cost of disposal, and
increased likelihood of stock out (Kishore et al. 2011). In order to manage these challenges, the
following tactics were extracted from the perishable research literature and are used in this
research to investigate the implications of HOS on the truck driving industry: capacity
utilization, substitution and/or elimination, planning, flexibility, FIFO and LIFO, and
heterogeneity.
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Hours of Service Background
Federal Motor Safety Carrier Association (FMSCA) establishes HOS regulations for
truck drivers. These regulations stipulate the maximum duty and driving hours of truck drivers.
Moreover, HOS rules limit both daily and weekly duty and driving hours of truck drivers.
Government agencies have stated that regulation in the trucking industry is important because of
the increased potential of an accident that occurs as truck drivers work additional hours (FMSCA
2015). Soccolich et al., (Soccolich et al. 2013) discussed the increased rate of safety incident
occurrences based on accumulating driving time (see Figure 6). This figure shows that truck
drivers become more of a safety liability as they reach higher driving hours. Previous research
has also filled gaps regarding the source of truck driver accidents. Most of this research has
measured the effects of singular restrictions and accidents with respect to fatigue, some examples
of effects include: multi-day driving patterns (Kaneko & Jovanis 1992), starting fatigue level (M.
R. Crum & Morrow 2002), driving hours per day (Hanowski et al. 2009; Soccolich et al. 2013),
driving time of day (Blower & Campbell 1998), breaks (Chen & Xie 2014a), sleeper-berths
(Hertz 1988), truck miles (Lyman & Braver 2003; Joshua & Garber 1990; Jovanis & Chang
1986), and truck driver health (Anderson et al. 2012). These types of research efforts have been
influential in changes that have been made to HOS regulations in the past. The following section
provides a historical perspective of some of these changes.
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Figure 6 Incident rate and driving hour (Soccolich et al., 2013)

History of Hours of Service (HOS)
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The Motor Carrier Act of 1935 authorized the Interstate Commerce Commission to
regulate commercial motor vehicles. In 1938, HOS was enacted with six main provisions (see
Table 4) (“Federal Register, Volume 65 Issue 85”, 2000). Shortly after the first HOS release,
there were two provisions and two redactions in 1939. The next change occurred in 1962,
removing the duty cycle provision. In 2003, three changes were made and regulators added two
new rules, a sleeper berth provision, and a restart provision. In 2005, there was one change
regarding the minimum number of hours authorized in a sleeper berth. In 2013, there were three
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new laws added: one stipulated a mandatory break within the first 8 hours of duty, and two

Table 4 History of HOS

Year Changed

1938

1939

1962

2003

2005

2013

2014

Driving Hours

12

10

10

11

11

11

11

On-Duty Hours

15

N/A

14

14

14

14

12

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

9

8

8

10

10

10

10

Duty Cycle

24

24

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

60 Hour (7-day)

60

60

60

60

60

60

60

70 Hour (8-day)

70

70

70

70

70

70

70

≥8

≥8

≥34

≥34

1 Per 168
Hrs

N/A

≥2

N/A

Max Daily
Work
Off-Duty
Hours

N/A

Break

≥34

Restart

≥34

Number of
Restarts
1 am to 5 am
Sleeper Berths
Split Sleep
Changes

7

4

1

≥2 hrs

≥8 hrs

≥8 hrs

≥8 hrs

5

1

3

2

restricted the use of the restart provision. In 2014, these two restart provisions were removed
pending reevaluation (FMSCA 2015). The number of HOS changes is reflected graphically in
Figure 7. Out of the total 23 changes, additions, or redactions; nearly half (11) of them have
occurred since 2003, indicating that the past decade has been particularly disruptive and
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uncertain for the trucking industry. The following section provides specific details concerning
HOS regulations that have been relevant since 2013.

Figure 7 Number of HOS Changes

Recent Hours of Service Regulations
Since 2013, the relevant daily HOS regulations mandated that truck drivers cannot drive
more than 11 hours per day, cannot be on duty for more than 14 hours per day and must have a
30-minute break within the first 8 hours of duty (FMSCA 2015). The weekly HOS regulations
further restrict the daily HOS regulations. Truck drivers can either utilize a maximum of 70 duty
hours within 8-days (if the company he/she is driving for operates 7-days a week) or 60 duty
hours within 7-days (if the company he/she is driving for operates 6 or fewer days per week).
One other regulation within HOS is the restart provision. The restart provision allows the truck
driver to rest for a certain period, thereby resetting all duty and driving hours back to zero. The
July 1, 2013 HOS update limited restart uses to 1 restart per 168 hours restriction or 1 per week.
It also stipulated that the restart must last at least 34 hours and must coincide with two full 1 am
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to 5 am periods (FMSCA 2015). The December 14, 2014 HOS update removed these restart
limitations, except for the 34-hour provision.
The goal of the July 1, 2013 HOS update was to decrease extensive working hours,
thereby reducing fatigue-related crashes and long-term health problems for truck drivers
(FMSCA 2015). The Federal Motor Safety Carrier Association (FMSCA) predicted that this rule
would decrease acute and chronic fatigue while only cutting work hours by 15 percent (2015).
In 2013 there were 342,000 crashes, 95,000 injuries, and 3,964 fatalities involving trucks
(NHTSA 2015). The regulatory policy proposed was anticipated to prevent 1,400 crashes (a
reduction of .41 percent), 560 injuries (a reduction of .59 percent), and 19 deaths (a reduction of
.48 percent) involving trucks per year (FMSCA 2015). The 2013 updated HOS rules have come
under scrutiny due to unintended consequences (Ferro 2014), higher associated costs than
estimated (Short 2013), and shortcomings regarding methodologies utilized to evaluate HOS
changes (Goel 2014; Brewster & Short 2014). This dissertation research provides additional
insight into this ongoing discussion.

Method
This research builds upon previous research by viewing the impact of HOS regulations
on truck drivers through the lens of perishable inventory theory. HOS regulations restrict the
hours that truck drivers can operate, as such, this research primarily analyzes the capacity
differences of these provisions. In order to understand the capacity differences in the various
HOS regulations, MATLAB v8.4 simulation was first utilized for the analysis of capacity
differences due to its coding flexibility in discrete modeling (Grewal & Andrews 2014). This
approach provided a general solution for most situations; however, due to the difficult
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interactions of constraints (weekly, daily, restarts, and breaks), the simulation missed some suboptimal solutions that were discovered using a different technique—Exhaustive Enumeration.
Exhaustive Enumeration is a simple (yet very time-consuming) optimization approach that
evaluates all the solutions for different combinations of discrete variables in order to identify the
region of feasible solutions. Utilizing a similar approach to Itti and Gokak (2013), the
Exhaustive Enumeration (EE) method provided optimal discrete values for all possible HOS
regulatory combinations. Utilizing the values generated by the EE method, all optimum discrete
points (average daily driving hours) were identified and graphed on a continuous scale.
Since the majority of truck drivers are paid per mile (Short 2013), and driving hours is a
good substitute for miles driven (Braver et al. 1999), this research used average daily driving
hours. Optimizing average daily driving hours enables comparisons, with respect to capacity, of
the different interactive effect of HOS regulations (daily, weekly, and restart provisions). Most
previous studies use a daily view to look at the effects of long duty hours on a given day
(Williamson et al. 1996; Hanowski et al. 2009; Soccolich et al. 2013; Chen & Xie 2014b). Some
previous studies use a weekly view to look at the compounding effects of multi-day operations on
fatigue (Beilock 1995; Mackie & Miller 1978; Kaneko & Jovanis 1992). Using this new
approach of average daily hours allows the analysis to consider both a daily view and weekly
view, but expresses the results in a way that is easy for truck drivers to understand their true
capacity given all constraints caused by the regulations.
Since truck drivers can increase average daily driving hours based on changing start and
end times, certain classifications are needed in order to enumerate average daily driving hours.
In the absence of HOS regulation, there are several reasons truck drivers would alter their
schedules: personal preferences, traffic congestion, disparate speed limits that occur at night, and
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pickup/delivery windows. HOS regulations have created incentives for truck drivers to change
their schedules to maximize their capacity in two ways. First, since the 24-hour duty cycle (first
introduced in 1938 and removed in 1962) no longer exists, truck drivers can currently change
their daily schedules. Second, truck drivers have an incentive to alter their weekly schedules at
the beginning or end of the week to optimize the restart time based upon the 1 am to 5 am
provision. Because of these different options created by the HOS regulations, this analysis
utilizes an approach similar to that of Murray and Short (2015) and considers three different
classifications types of drivers: 1) truck drivers that have no schedule changes, 2) truck drivers
that have weekly schedule changes (at the start or end of each weekly time period), and 3) truck
drivers that have daily schedule changes. The relevant HOS provisions used in this analysis (and
their corresponding lines on HOS logbooks) are discussed in the following paragraphs.
The daily HOS regulations restrict the amount of driving and duty time and require
breaks and rest time (constraints shown below). Driving time is restricted to 11 hours per period.
Duty time is restricted to 14 hours per period, starts at the beginning of a shift, and accumulates
continuously until being reset by 10 consecutive off-duty hours. A 30-minute break is required
in any given 8-hour duty period. For purposes of the analysis, the daily restrictions are
expressed mathematically as follows:
Driving Time ≤ 11 hours
Duty Time ≤ 14 Hours
Consecutive Hours Off Duty ≥ 10 Hours
Break ≥ 30 Minutes (if duty time is ≥ 8 consecutive hours)
Unlike daily HOS regulations, weekly HOS regulations only restrict duty hours. The 70
duty hours over 8 days or 60 duty hours over 7 days provisions prescribe the maximum amount
of hours that can be attained during that timeframe without a restart being used. A truck driver is
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under the 70-hour provision if the company he/she is driving for operates 7 days per week, and is
under the 60-hour provision if the company operates 6 or fewer days per week. While any break
time counts against the 14-hour duty clock mentioned above, it does not count towards weekly
duty time provisions. Only duty or driving time count towards these 8-day or 7-day hours;
meaning that break times during the day count only against the 14-hour clock. These weekly
restrictions lead to the following additional mathematical expressions:
Duty Time ≤ 60 hours (for 7 day period)
Duty Time ≤ 70 hours (for 8 day period)
The final set of mathematical expressions that are necessary for the analysis involve
restarts. The restart provision before July 1, 2013 allowed for an unlimited number of restarts
and required a consecutive 34-hour break. From July 1, 2013 to December 16, 2014 the restart
provision still required a consecutive 34-hour break; but also mandated that the break period
include two consecutive 1 am to 5 am periods and also limited the number of restarts to 1 restart
per 168 hours restriction. In this analysis, when the 1 am to 5 am provision is used it is in
combination with the 1 restart per 168 hours restriction. The restart-related restrictions are
stated mathematically as:
Restart ≥ 34 hours
Restart Number < 1 per 168-hours
Restart = 2 consecutive nights (1 am to 5 am)
The Exhaustive Enumeration (EE) method was based on maximizing truck-driver
driving time. This was accomplished using a layered approach by first optimizing daily driving
hours, followed by accounting for the 70-hour (8-day) or 60-Hour (7-day) constraints, and then
by considering the different restart constraints (Unlimited, 1 restart per 168 hours restriction, and
1 restart per 168 hours restriction with the 1 am to 5 am provision (see Figure 8). The discrete
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values used in EE to optimize driver capacity were based on the smallest time restriction – the
mandatory 30 minute break. Thus, 48 different start times were analyzed starting at 00:00 and
ending at 23:30. This study examines and compares the maximum average daily driving hours
that a truck driver can operate under the different restrictions and helps illustrate the implications
of the perishable inventory theory tactics.

Figure 8 Layered Aspects of HOS

In addition to the above considerations, the analysis also accounts for the effects of
congestion on average daily driving hours. Congestion and the 1 am to 5 am provision create
preferred driving times. In order to generalize the effects of congestion, this research utilized the
buffer index (BI). BI was used in the 2011 Congested Corridors Report (Eisele et al. 2011) and
ensures 95 percent on time rate by adding additional “buffer time” to the schedule or route based
on statistical data gathered from 328 different traffic corridors across the country. The 328
different traffic corridors Buffer Indexes are averaged in order to provide the best sample for
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approximating congestion across America. Since traffic congestion varies by location, a
sensitivity analysis from zero to 260 percent BI is applied.

Analysis
The analysis calculates average daily driving hours under several different scenarios to
determine capacity utilization. Since truck drivers predominantly operate under the 70-hour
provision, most of the analysis uses the 70-hour constraint1. The first section analyzes truck
drivers that have no schedule changes except those immediately following a change to a given
HOS regulation. Truck drivers that have weekly schedule changes (at the start or end of each
weekly time period) are addressed in the second section, followed by a section addressing truck
drivers that have daily schedule changes. The final section provides the mathematical rationale
for the unintended consequences of increased congestion due to the 1 am to 5 am provision.
No Change in Truck Driver Schedule
Some truck drivers operate on regular, stable, and consistent schedules that do not
fluctuate from day-to-day or from week-to-week (no schedule changes). When HOS regulations
are changed, these drivers may alter their schedules to adapt to the new provisions, but will then

1

The average daily driving hours are lower for the 60-hour restriction and there are similar patterns in the results except for one

aspect – 168 hours equals 7 days, thus the 60-hour (7-day) restriction falls within the same time period as the 1 restart per 168
hours, eliminating any restart benefit.
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maintain the revised schedule going forward. Although a truck driver can drive fewer than 11
hours per day, Figure 9 shows the maximum average daily driving hours that can be achieved
under various HOS regulations and highlights the points of divergence, which are created by
these restrictions. All restrictions equate to the same average daily driving hours up to 9.25
hours of duty per day (.5 hours for a break and 8.75 hours of driving). The 8-day (70-hour) rule
begins to diverge the amount of average daily driving hours that can be achieved and limits the
average daily driving to 8.75 hours (70 hours ÷ 8 days = 8.75) until a restart occurs. The next
point of divergence occurs at 10.8 duty hours above which restarts provide greater average daily
driving hours than the 70-hour restriction.
The final divergence occurs at 12.5 duty hours and separates the unlimited restart
provision from the 1 restart per 168 hours restriction and 1 am to 5 am provision. Under the
unlimited restart provision, a truck driver can begin a restart period at any time. Under the 1
restart per 168 hours restriction a driver can still begin a restart at any time, but taking a restart at
any point prior to 134 duty hours will translate into a restart period being longer than the
minimum required 34 hours, thus leading to lower average daily driving hours.
Table 2 shows that drivers cannot actually drive 11 hours on average per day (as a simple
look at the HOS regulations might suggest). Instead, 9.43 hours is the maximum average daily
driving hours that can be achieved under any of the HOS regulations, assuming no schedule
changes. For purposes of calculating the maximum and average percent differences, only the
points to the right of the first divergence are included. The data points inside the shaded box are
excluded because they are the same for all of the different provisions and restrictions. The 70hour restriction is the most limiting in terms of average daily driving hours. Under the daily
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restrictions, a driver can see a 54.6 percent increase in average daily driving hours over what can
be achieved under the 70-hour restriction.
The analysis shows that restarts can be very beneficial in terms of improving average
daily driving hours. Table 5 shows that unlimited restart provision can improve daily driving
averages significantly. When compared to the 70-hour provision, the unlimited restart provision
can increase daily driving averages by up to 28.6 percent. However, there are substantial
differences between the various restart provisions. The unlimited restart provision yields a 12.5
percent increase in average daily driving hours over the 1 restart per 168 hours restriction.

Table 5 Percent Difference between Restrictions and/or Provisions Assuming No Changes to a Truck Driver's
Schedule

Comparison of Restrictions and/or Provisions
70-Hour Restriction Vs. 1 Restart Per 168 Hour Provision
70-Hour Restriction Vs. Unlimited Restart Provision
70-Hour Restriction Vs. Daily Restrictions
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Provision Vs. Unlimited Restart Provision
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Provision Vs. Daily Restrictions
Unlimited Restart Provision Vs. Daily Restrictions

Max % Average
Differenc
14.6% %8.0%
28.6% 11.7%
54.3% 28.7%
12.5%
3.3%
35.0% 18.6%
20.0% 14.7%

As Figure 9 shows, improving the efficiency ratio (driving time ÷ duty time) greatly
improves the number of average daily driving hours, which in turn affects capacity. While the
lines in this figure illustrate the maximum average daily driving hours that can be legally driven
under the various restrictions and provisions, drivers can certainly achieve lower average daily
driving hours that may be dictated by customer requirements. After 12.17 daily duty hours
(11.67 duty hours counted against the weekly 70-hour limit because of the 30 minute break), the
truck driver begins to lose driving capacity. This occurs because driving is limited to 11 hours
per day, and adding more duty hours limits potential duty time on future days. Specifically, for
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every minute of duty over 12.17 hours, a minute of driving is lost during one of the days left
before the next restart period. This demonstrates what can be accomplished by eliminating or
substituting non-value added duty time (one of the tactics used to deal with perishability) thus
ensuring maximum driving time and increasing the efficiency ratio.

Highlighted
values are not
used for percent
differences shown
in Table 2

Figure 9 Maximum Average Daily Driving Hours under Various HOS regulations for Drivers Following a Consistent
Schedule

Weekly Change in Truck Driver Schedule
Weekly schedule change refers to altering a truck driver’s end time on the day before the
beginning of the restart and/or the start time on the day after the completion of the restart. These
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two changes (which are a consequence of the 1 am to 5 am restart provision) are discussed in
greater detail in the following paragraphs.
Changing the end time on the day before the restart may enable a truck driver to decrease
the duration of the restart, thus, increase average daily driving hours. For instance, a truck driver
who operates 14-duty hours per day and desires to avoid a restart that is longer than the required
34 hours should begin operating between 5 am and 11 am, thus ending before 1 am (see Figure
10 Timeline A). This occurs because the 1 am to 5 am provision requires two complete and
consecutive periods. If a truck driver works past 1 am, the driver will not be able to count any
portion of that 1 am to 5 am time period as part of their restart. For example, if a truck driver
begins at noon and stops at 2:00 am, the required restart duration would be 51 hours rather than
34 hours that it could have been if the driver had stopped working at 1:00 am (see Figure 10
Timeline C). Increased restart hour duration can also occur if the truck driver ends too early,
because additional hours of waiting are needed until the 5 am provision is reached. For instance,
if a truck driver begins his/her 14-hour duty day at 20:00 (8 pm) and ends at 10:00 the next day,
the restart duration would be 43 hours (see Figure 10 Timeline B). These two examples illustrate
that the restart duration can change based upon the end time prior to the beginning of the restart
period.
After completing a restart, a truck driver can either choose to wait to start driving until
his/her normal start time, or choose to begin driving immediately following the restart (at 5 am)
and then maintain on that revised start time for the remainder of that duty week. The choice they
make, based on their preferences, can lead to what we have labeled a preference penalty, which,
if incurred, decreases average daily driving hours. For example, if a truck driver begins at 20:00
and ends at 10:00 (a 14-hour duty day), the driver’s restart duration is 43 hours (due to 2
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complete and consecutive 1 am to 5 am periods) and then an additional 15 hours (from 05:00 to
20:00) is needed to begin at the normal start time (see Figure 10 Timeline D). A truck driver
could actually begin driving immediately after the restart is complete at 5 am, thus, eliminating
the addition 15 hours of preferred waiting time. Figure 11 Timeline E provides a similar
example of a preference penalty and also demonstrates that the sum of the restart period and the
preference penalty durations ranges from 34 hours to 58 hours under a 14-hour duty day
scenario. As the restart period duration increases, the preference penalty duration decreases by
the same amount.
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Figure 10 Restart Duration Examples
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Figure 11 Preference Penalty Examples
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Various equations were generated using the Exhaustive Enumeration (EE) method to
better understand the relationship between the restart period and the preference penalty
durations. In order to maximize the average daily driving hours, a truck driver needs to
minimize the restart period and preference penalty durations. To do this, the driver must start
within a specific time window. This specific window and other relevant variables are defined
mathematically as follows:
Equations Group 1: Hours of Service Variables
dutyPeriodHours = truck driver daily duty duration
startTime = time truck driver starts duty
startHours = the difference between 0 am and startTime
restartHours = duration of restart period
preferencePenaltyHours = length of delay due to driver preferred start time
lostHours = restartHours + preferencePenaltyHours
windowStartTime = 5 am
windowHours = 20 hours – dutyPeriodHours
windowEndTime = 5 am + windowHours

The mathematical definitions above can be utilized to calculate restart period, preference
penalty, and total hours as follows:
Equations Group 2: Truck Driver Restart Hours
If windowEndTime ≥ startTime, then restartHours = 34 hours
If windowEndTime < startTime, then restartHours = (57 hours + windowHours) - startHours
Equations Group 3: Truck Driver Preference Penalty Hours
If startTime ≥ 5 and If windowEndTime ≥ startTime, then preferencePenaltyHours = 14 hours – dutyPeriodHours
If startTime ≥ 5 and If windowEndTime < startTime, then preferencePenaltyHours = startHours – 5 hours
If startTime < 5 am, then preferencePenaltyHours = 19 hours + startHours

Truck Driver Restart Hours & Truck Driver Preference Penalty:
Equations Group 4: Truck Driver Restart and Preference Penalty Hours
If windowHours + 5 hours ≥ startHours, then totalHours = 48 hours – dutyPeriodHours
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If windowHours + 5 hours < startHours, then totalHours = 52 hours + windowHours

These equations were utilized to construct Figure 12, which illustrates the total restart
hours that correspond with various start and end times for truck drivers working 8, 11, or 14 duty
hours per day. In this figure, the bottom region represents the windowHours for the truck driver.
If a truck driver begins his/her duty day outside the windowStartTime and windowEndTime
(illustrated in Figure 12), the totalHours can increase by 71 percent (from 34 to 58 hours).
Further analysis illustrates the relationship between totalHours and the average daily
driving hours (see Figure 13 and Table 6). Since the truck driver can legally choose to incur a
preference penalty, three different levels were created for average daily driving hours: low,
medium and high. Low indicates a truck driver having the longest restart period and preference
penalty durations possible and therefore achieving the lowest possible average daily driving
hours (operating outside the windowStartTime and windowEndTime). Medium indicates the
average totalHours for all of the 48 enumerated start and corresponding end times. High
indicates a truck driver operating within the windowStartTime and windowEndTime, thereby
achieving the highest average daily driving hours under the 1 am to 5 am restart provision.

windowStart

windowEnd
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Figure 12 1 am to 5 am Provision
Start Times

As shown in the Figure 13, utilizing a restart (under the 1 restart per 168 hours restriction
and 1 am to 5 am provision) is not beneficial until the driver operates more than 10.7 hours on
average within the first 6 days. At 11.5 hours the maximum amount of average daily driving
hours are achieved for all three categories 9.43 (high), 8.63 (medium), and 8.25 (low).

Highlighted values are not
used for percent differences
shown in Table 3. 9.25 Duty
Hours are used to compare
values from Figure 8.

Figure 13 1 am to 5 am Provision and Average Daily Driving Hours

Table 6 directly compares the maximum average daily driving hours that can be achieved
under the various HOS regulations. A truck driver under the 1 restart per 168 hour restriction
and 1 am to 5 am provision low (see Table 6) drives a maximum of 10.2 percent less than a 1
restart per 168 hour restriction and 1 am to 5 am provision medium, and a maximum of 14.6
percent less than 1 restart per 168 hour restriction and 1 am to 5 am provision high.
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Furthermore, a truck driver in the 1 restart per 168 hours restriction and 1 am to 5 am provision
low will drive 12.5 percent (max) and -1.5 percent (average) fewer hours than if he/she operated
under the 70-hour provision only, and 28.6 percent (max) fewer hours than using the unlimited
restart provision. This indicates that there are numerous schedules that will never benefit from
using a restart under the 1 restart per 168 hours restriction and 1 am to 5 am provision; restricting
the truck drivers to the 70-hour restriction and indicating a large impact to trucking capacity for
these schedules. Conversely, for the 1 restart per 168 hour restriction and 1 am to 5 am provision
medium there is an increase of 10.2 percent over the 70-hour restriction, indicating that the
restart is indeed beneficial.
The different restart provisions and associated average daily driving hours illustrate large
capacity changes, which provide equally large incentives for truck drivers to alter their weekly
schedules to increase capacity through the perishability tactics of proper planning, flexibility, and
heterogeneity. The next section analyzes daily changes to a truck driver’s schedule that can

Table 6 Comparison of Restrictions and/or Provisions Assuming No and/or Moderate Truck Driver Schedule
Changes
Max % Average %
Comparison of Restrictions and/or Provisions
Difference Difference
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Low) Vs. 70-Hour Restriction
12.5%
1.9%
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Low) Vs. 1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Medium) 10.2%
4.2%
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Low) Vs. 1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction 1 am to 5 am (High)
14.6%
9.8%
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Low) Vs. Unlimited Restart Provision
28.6%
12.2%
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Low) Vs. Daily Restrictions
54.3%
29.8%
70-Hour Restriction Vs. 1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Medium)
10.2%
2.4%
70-Hour Restriction Vs. 1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (High)
14.6%
7.8%
70-Hour Restriction Vs. Unlimited Restart Provision
28.6%
10.2%
70-Hour Restriction Vs. Daily Restrictions
54.3%
27.4%
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Medium) Vs. 1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (High)
9.8%
5.3%
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Medium) Vs. Unlimited Restart Provision
16.7%
7.5%
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Medium) Vs. Daily Restrictions
40.0%
24.2%
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (High) Vs. Unlimited Restart Provision
12.5%
2.1%
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (High) Vs. Daily Restrictions
35.0%
17.8%
Unlimited Restart Provision Vs. Daily Restrictions
20.0%
15.3%

increase capacity even more.
Note: Daily Driving indicates the 14-hour duty restriction, 30-minute break requirement, and 11-hour driving restriction. 70-Hour indicates the
layering of the daily driving restrictions and the 70-hour (8-day) restriction. Unlimited indicates the layering of the daily driving restrictions, the
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70-hour (8-day) restriction, and the unlimited restart provision. 168 Low, 168 Medium, and 168 High indicates the layering of the daily driving
restrictions, 70-hour (8-day) restriction, and the 1 restart per 168 hours restriction with the 1 am to 5 am provision.

Daily Change in a Truck Driver Schedule
Although it is unlikely that a truck driver would change his/her schedule daily for a
lengthy time period (multiple weeks or months), it is likely that under the right incentives a truck
driver would change his/her schedule daily for a shorter period (multiple days or a week).
Change to daily driving start times can increase average daily driving hours dramatically because
it capitalizes on the fact that there is no 24-hour cycle mandate. For example, a truck driver can
legally be on duty for 12 hours, accomplishing 11 hours of driving, sleep for 10 hours and then
begin again after 22 hours have passed. This will allow a truck driver to begin duty again 2
hours prior to their previous start time and enable the truck driver to accumulate more average
daily driving hours. By having daily schedule changes, it is possible to drive an average of 10.35
hours per day (a 9.8 percent increase over not making daily schedule changes) under the
unlimited restart provision – the highest possible driving hours that can be legally achieved (see
Figure 9 and Figure 14). Although less than the hours accumulated under the unlimited restart
provision, the 1 restart per 168 hours restriction also increases the average daily driving hours to
10 hours from 9.43 hours. No increase in average daily driving hours is achieved under only the
70-hour restriction.
As Table 7 illustrates, the unlimited restart provision offers 32.2 percent higher average
daily driving hours than the 70-hour (8-day) restriction; 20.2 percent higher average daily driving
hours than the 1 restart per 168 hour restriction (low), and up to a 15.7 percent higher average
daily driving hours than the 1 restart per 168 hour restriction (medium and high).
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Although capacity is increased, there are dramatic changes to the daily schedule,
which impact a truck driver’s circadian rhythm. At the highest average daily driving hours,

Highlighted values are not used for percent
differences shown in Table 4. 6-duty hour per
period equates to 9-duty hours per day.

Figure 14 Daily Change in Truck Driver Schedule

11.5 hours duty and 11 hours of driving, a truck driver would begin to drive 2.5 hours earlier
than his/her previous start time. After 6 cycles (66 hours of driving) a truck driver would
have swapped his/her scheduled start time by 12.5 hours. A truck driver could also switch
their cycle by a lesser amount, but it would still have a cumulative impact on his/her
circadian rhythm.
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Table 7 Daily Changes in Truck Driver Schedule
Max % Average %
Comparison of Restrictions and/or Provisions
Difference Difference
70-Hour Restriction Vs. 1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Low)
10.0%
3.4%
70-Hour Restriction Vs. 1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Medium)
14.3%
8.7%
70-Hour Restriction Vs. 1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (High)
14.3%
10.9%
70-Hour Restriction Vs. Unlimited Restart Provision
32.2%
16.3%
70-Hour Restriction Vs. Daily Restrictions
54.3%
37.1%
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Low) Vs. 1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Medium)
6.7%
5.2%
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Low) Vs. 1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (High)
10.4%
7.4%
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Low) Vs. Unlimited Restart Provision
20.2%
12.3%
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Low) Vs. Daily Restrictions
40.2%
32.3%
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Medium) Vs. 1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (High)
3.8%
2.1%
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Medium) Vs. Unlimited Restart Provision
15.7%
6.8%
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Medium) Vs. Daily Restrictions
35.0%
25.8%
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (High) Vs. Unlimited Restart Provision
15.7%
4.7%
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (High) Vs. Daily Restrictions
35.0%
23.4%
Unlimited Restart Provision Vs. Daily Restrictions
21.0%
17.8%

Comparison of Daily Schedule and No Schedule Changes
As already mentioned, daily schedule changes correspond to increased average daily
driving hours. The magnitude of the differences between four scenarios representing no
schedule changes and daily schedule changes are illustrated in Figure 15. At 10.5 hours of
duty, a daily schedule-changing driver achieves 14.3 percent more (10 versus 8.75) hours of
average daily driving under both the unlimited restart provision and 1 per 168 restart
restriction compared to the unlimited restart provision for a driver with no schedule changes.
Figure 11 also reveals that a daily schedule-changing driver operating under the 1 restart per
168 hour restriction will achieve more daily driving hours than the unlimited restart provision
under no schedule changes for less than 12.2 duty hours. Thus, there is a significant increase
in capacity through daily schedule changes, especially when compared to no schedule
changes. A truck driver operating under no schedule changes, the 1 restart per 168 hour
restriction, and 1 am to 5 am provision (low) experiences a 29 percent (max) decrease in
capacity at 10.9 duty hours when compared to the unlimited restart provision and the 1 restart
per 168 hours restriction and 1 to 5 am provision under daily schedule changes.
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Figure 15 Daily Schedule Changes Vs. No Schedule Changes

This section reveals large incentives for truck drivers to increase their efficiency and
reduce the cycle period duration in order to capture higher average daily driving hours.
However, these incentives come with daily schedule changes, potential fatigue, and higher
chance of an accident based on the heterogeneity capabilities (perishable concept) of the
truck driver.
Congestion
The last section of the analysis details the implications of the 1 am to 5 am provision
and one of its unintended consequences—increased congestion due to an increased incentive
to drive during daylight hours (Short 2013; Ferro 2014). The analysis above has
demonstrated that average daily driving hours can be increased when a truck driver operates
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within the optimal time frame (which for a 14-hour duty day, involves starting to drive
between 5 am and 11 am). The more drivers who choose to operate within this optimal time
frame, the more congestion is created, leading to decreased driving efficiency in terms of the
distance that can be traveled during a given time period. This section analyzes the tradeoffs
between driving during the optimal time frame (and facing increased congestion levels, thus
reducing the overall miles driven) or driving outside the optimal time frame (and facing the
consequences of increased restart duration and preference penalty hours which decrease
average daily driving hours and thus the overall miles driven).
Congestion is the result of many factors: economic trends, weather, accidents, work
zones, disparate speeds, and road capacity (Short and Murray, 2014). It is important to note
that a truck increases congestion more than a car because of the increased size, decreased
maneuverability, increased driving spacing, lower driving speed, and decreased acceleration
capability (Kaisy, Jung, and Rakha, 2007). Research has shown that, in non-congested
traffic, trucks are equivalent to 1.5 cars on a level freeway, 2.5 on a rolling freeway, and 4.5
on a mountainous freeway (HCM, 2000). Recent research has shown that these values are
low when considering the effects of congestion, or stop-and-go traffic. For example, Kaisy
et al. (2001) found that trucks account for 2.5 cars on a level freeway during congested hours;
a 66 percent increase from a non-congested level freeway.
The 2011 Congested Corridors Report (CCR) establishes two different main
congested periods, 6 to 10 am and 3 to 7 pm. During these congested periods, traffic speeds
are reduced. Since the majority of truck drivers are paid per mile, their hourly driving is not
as efficient in congestion. The CCR provides a buffer index (BI) (ranging from 10 to 260
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percent) that can be used for planning purposes to ensure an on-time arrival rate of 95 percent
when driving in congested traffic (see Figure 16 and the following equation).

Figure 16 Congestion Lost Hours (Five 11-Hour days)

Equation 5: Congestion and Hours of Service Penalty Hours
totalLostHours = restartHours + preferencePenaltyHours + congestionLostHours

If a truck driver starts driving at 6 am and drives for 11 hours he/she drives during
two main congestion periods (6 am to 10 am and 3 pm to 5 pm) for a total of 6 hours or 55
percent (6/11) of the time. Utilizing a BI of 100 percent, what would normally take 3 hours
now incurs 3 congestionLostHours (for a total of 6 hours) due to the congestion. Therefore,
after driving 5 days, this schedule produces 15 lost hours. However, starting at 7 pm (19:00)
this schedule produces zero lost hours after 5 days because no congestion periods are
encountered.
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Figure 17 illustrates the rationale for truck drivers to ultimately switch to daytime
schedules in order to minimize totalLostHours. Even a start time of 6 am with a BI of 260
percent has approximately four fewer totalLostHours than starting at 7 pm. Increasing
congestion during the day, however, has many safety, economic, and environmental
implications.

Figure 17 Congestion and 1 am to 5 am provision

Discussion
This section ties the analytical results above to the tactics from perishable inventory
theory (capacity utilization, flexibility, substitution and/or elimination, FIFO and LIFO, and
long-term plan) and discusses implications for truck drivers.
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Capacity Utilization
Capacity utilization was measured by finding the maximum average daily driving
hours under the different restrictions and provisions. The different restrictions and
provisions along with the schedules of truck drivers (no, weekly, and daily schedule changes)
were shown to have significant differences in capacity (see Table 6 and Table 7, and Figure
9, Figure 12, Figure 14 Figure 15).
Limiting how much a truck driver can drive has many ripple effects on the truck
driving industry. When hours are changed for truck drivers, the balance between the number
of tractors and drivers, distribution nodes, and support personnel change. For example, the 1
restart per 168 hours and 1 am to 5 am provision was found to significantly decrease the
amount of driving by up to 28.6 percent (see Table 6). Since drivers could not operate as
many hours, and companies desired to maintain the same service level, additional tractors,
trailers and drivers were needed (Short 2013). Unfortunately, 80.1 percent of respondents
from that study still indicated loss of productivity, even with the additional equipment and
personnel. The addition of new equipment and hiring of new drivers have subsequent safety
implications that are discussed more under the flexibility tactic.
Capacity is not only based upon the hours of driving but how efficient that driving is
with respect to miles traveled. Congestion can restrict driving capacity further decreasing the
miles driven by truck drivers than driving during non-congested periods. This research has
shown that under the 1 am to 5 am provision, truck drivers can paradoxically achieve the
least amount of total lost driving hours (and thereby increase the total miles driven) by
operating during the congested daytime periods. By removing the 1 am to 5 am provision
and operating under an unlimited restart provision, drivers would be able to drive more
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during uncongested time periods and thereby achieve even more miles. Research has shown
that traffic flow was the single most important factor (more than circadian rhythm) in
determining accident rate (Dingus et al. 2006). Moreover, higher disparity of speed
differences between vehicle types has also been shown to increase accident rates, due to the
acceleration and deceleration differences between large and small vehicles in congestion
(Neeley & Richardson 2009). Basically, as congestion increases, the rate of accidents also
increases (Kononov et al. 2008). Campbell (1995) suggested providing incentives for truck
drivers to operate outside the congested periods in order to ameliorate the effect of increased
congestion. However, FMSCA’s 1 am to 5 am provision, resulted in the opposite by
providing drivers an incentive to drive more during congested periods, which only adds to
the congestion levels and possible related safety consequences (Commerce Appropriations
Act, 2014).
Unfortunately, there are more negative impacts that result from the 1 am to 5 am
provision such as increased CO2 emissions. Operating a vehicle at lower average speeds
because of more braking, accelerating, and idle time not only causes more wear on the
equipment and subsequent higher disposal rates, but it also has a large environmental impact
due to increased CO2 emissions (Campbell 1995; Golias 2015; Figliozzi 2011).
Flexibility
HOS regulations are intended to restrict the hours that truck drivers can work or
drive, thus, limiting their flexibility in several ways. Three of which will be discussed here.
First, the analysis above has shown that the continuously accumulating 14-hour duty day
restriction limits the choices that drivers can make (such as whether or not to take a nap)
which can limit their capacity and consequently their ability to earn money. Evidence has
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shown that naps result in a lower accident rate and improved work performance (Macchi et
al. 2002; Philip et al. 2006). Without the pressure created by the continuously accumulating
duty hour restriction, drivers are free to nap when they are fatigued and drive when they feel
rested. The continuously accumulating aspect of the restriction, creates a negative incentive
for drivers to nap. Every minute a driver spends preparing for or taking a nap is a minute of
their duty day that is lost and the rest of the week’s schedule can be severely influenced due
to the continuously accumulating duty hour restriction and the 10-hour break following the
14-hour limit. For example, a driver who takes a rest for 2 hours may no longer reach the
desired location within the 14-hour window, which causes a delay of greater than 10 hours
due to the mandatory 10-hour break. This decision to nap, therefore, can also influence the
rest of the week’s schedule through the loss or modification of future loads. As shown in this
example, the continuously accumulating 14-hour duty restriction can provide large
disincentives for truck drivers to take a nap or rest during their duty day. In fact, the majority
of drivers who fall asleep reported that they were aware of their fatigue but continued to
drive (Abrams et al. 1997). Furthermore, if the continuously accumulating aspect of the
daily duty limit was removed, some truck drivers could avoid high congestion periods (6 to
10 am and 3 to 7 pm) by taking naps. This would not only reduce congestion, but increase
truck driver’s capacity due to a decrease in the total hours (see totalLossHours in Figure 17).
Second, the weekly provisions, including the 1 restart per 168 hours restriction and 1
am to 5 am provision (low) has been shown (see Table 6) in this analysis to decrease capacity
by 28.6 percent (max) when compared to the unlimited restart provision and 14.6 percent
(max) when compared to the 1 restart per 168 hour restriction and 1 am to 5 am provision
(high). This decrease in capacity was the result of the increased restart duration and
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preference penalty hours from not starting a truck driver’s day between 5 am and 11 am for a
14-hour duty day. Thus, this restriction and provision decreases the flexibility of times that
truck drivers can maintain a certain capacity or service level. Furthermore, under the 1 am to
5 am provision, this research illustrated that truck drivers achieve higher driving efficiency
by operating during daytime hours even with a congestion BI of 260% or 3.6 times slower
than normal traffic.
The analysis above demonstrates why the OOIDA Foundation (2011) and Short
(2014) found that a majority of drivers (approximately 79 percent) claimed that they lost
flexibility in managing their schedule with their workload because of this restriction and
provision; leading to driving during peak congested times as well as increased stress and
fatigue levels. This dissertation analysis furthers this previous research by providing the
economic rationale for these previous findings. For truck drivers who start between 5 am and
11 am (for a 14-hour duty day), a restart can lead to an increase in average daily driving
hours (see Figure 9, Figure 13Figure 14). Whereas for truck drivers starting outside of the 5
am to 11 am period (for 14-hour duty day) the 1 restart per 168 hour restriction and 1 am to 5
am provision is not beneficial, which leads drivers to not use restarts unless a preference
penalty is utilized: however, not using the preference penalty has ramifications on circadian
rhythm. Furthermore, truck drivers operating during any time period of the day, under the
60-hour (7-day) restriction, do not benefit from a 1 restart per 168 hour restriction. Thus,
almost all of HOS regulations restrict the number of driving or duty hours within a given
period, but the 1 am to 5 am provision restricts the time of day (when) at which driving and
duty should occur through monetary incentives.
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Third, flexibility is also critical for businesses to optimally manage their workforce
and equipment in order to meet required service levels. This research revealed that 23 total
HOS regulations changes have occurred since 1938, and approximately half of them (11)
occurred since 2003 (see Figure 7 and Table 4). These 11 changes were also significant with
respect to the amount of average daily driving hours that can be achieved (see Table 4, Table
5, Table 6, and Table 7). This analysis demonstrates that the truck driving industry is in an
uncertain and highly fluctuating regulatory environment. Research has found that companies
who increase flexibility, through adaptation of schedules in uncertain regulatory
environments, tend to succeed (Alexander 1991; Engau & Hoffmann 2011). Companies
have achieved flexibility by making the workforce less permanent (Rugman & Verbeke
1998). Hiring temporary drivers, renting equipment, or contracting jobs limits their risk and
exposure in the event of an accident (Tikriti 2015) while also not risking heavy investments
that may not amortize. However, such practices have been shown to decrease safety due to
recently hired truck drivers and their route unfamiliarity (Brown 1986; Staplin & Gish 2005;
Belzer et al. 2014), different maintenance practices for leased equipment (Yeh et al. 2009).
Thus, in addition to the fatigue aspects of safety, there are other safety-related, unintended
consequences of HOS regulations.
In summary, fatigue and accidents may not be reduced by regulatory policy because
of the effects on truck driver flexibility; because increased flexibility has been found to
increase driver safety (Mackie & Miller 1978; Griffin et al. 1992; Jensen & Dahl 2009).
Flexible schedules increase truck safety by providing truck drivers and truck dispatchers
ample time and choices to account for fatigue level, congestion, weather, and loading
requirements (Braver et al 1992).
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Substitution and/or Elimination
As this research has shown, there are drastic differences in average daily driving
hours under the different HOS regulations (see Figure 9, Figure 12 , Figure 13, and Figure
14), which directly relates to miles driven. Most truck drivers are paid by the mile, which is
a major reason truck drivers prefer to not just be on duty, but to drive efficiently. Similarly,
truck companies need to move goods (a function of distance), which also directly relates to
hours driven (Williamson and Friswell, 2013). Generally, if truck drivers are on duty but not
driving, they are loading or unloading their trucks. There are strong economic pressures to
minimize the loading and unloading times; and truck drivers are continually looking to
hasten their loading and unloading times to eliminate the time spent not driving (Morrow &
Crum 2004; Duke et al. 2010). This can lead to less secure loads and possible safety
implications (McKnight & Bahouth 2009). For example, HOS regulations create pressure for
drivers to focus on maximizing their precious driving time under a continuously
accumulating 14-hour duty clock, by rushing loading and unloading times. Such rushing can
increase driver stress and fatigue. The effects of driver involvement in loading/unloading are
mixed: initially, alertness may be improved but these effects wear off quickly and contribute
to greater driver fatigue, especially during long duty days (Barns, 2000). Outsourcing these
loading and unloading duties to someone other than the driver (as a form of substitution) may
not only prevent improper loading, but may also decrease the overall fatigue of truck drivers;
thereby, improving the performance of the truck driver’s perishable time.
Truck drivers have seen a decrease in fatigue levels through other substitution effects.
Information technology (IT) has enabled truck drivers to seamlessly take care of non-driving
duties (Kettinger et al. 2012). Some of these non-driving duties have already been
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researched and indicate a growing trend of substitution: dispatcher communication and
tracking systems for driver scheduling (Zohar et al. 2014); GPS technology for routes
(Towns & Cobb 2012); and IT in truck parking (Sándor & Csiszár 2013). IT substitutions
are even more critical for truck drivers that approach their HOS limits and potentially
become perishable (Woensel et al. 2007). These IT substitutions have not only increased the
efficiency of truck drivers perishable driving time, but they have also reduced the stress and
fatigue that is associated with a higher potential for accidents (Min 2009b). Our research
indicates that substitution and or elimination tactic of perishability is therefore a critical
component of increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of truck driver’s perishable time.
FIFO/LIFO
The concepts of FIFO and LIFO can also increase the total capacity for truck drivers
and truck driving companies. Once truck drivers begin their duty day, it is critical that they
are handled under the FIFO model because of the continuously accumulating 14-hour daily
constraint. FIFO minimizes the expected obsolescence. Research has found that
implementing FIFO policies for perishable products can minimize expired items by as much
as 40 percent (Broekmeulen & Donselaar 2007). The results of this research reveal that this
tactic may provide similar average daily driving hour benefits for truck drivers (a special
type of perishable inventory). Using FIFO allows drivers to attain the highest average daily
driving times shown in Figure 9 Maximum Average Daily Driving Hours under Various
HOS regulations for Drivers Following a Consistent Schedulewhereas using LIFO results in
fewer hours but greater perishable time with respect to the individual.
Sometimes, however, in order to ensure delivery of high valued goods, the policy of
LIFO may be more appropriate. If the product has greater value than the perishable time of
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the truck driver, it is appropriate to employ LIFO to ensure product delivery. Less
predictable factors such as weather, congestion, and maintenance issues necessitate utilizing
a driver with the most available duty time in order to ensure timely delivery.
Regulations can lead to increased fatigue by altering the utilization of FIFO and
LIFO. For example, the 1 restart per 168 hours restriction with the 1 am to 5 am provision
was shown to provide great incentive to alter a schedule in order to minimize the total restart
hours by 71 percent (see totalRestartHours Figure 12). However, a restart does not
necessarily indicate a well-rested driver. Our analysis has shown that compliance with the
regulations and restrictions can lead to a significant change in a driver’s normal circadian
rhythm. These circadian rhythm changes can cause safe-driving-perishability in terms of
fatigue well before they reach their duty or driving hour limitations. Crum and Morrow
(2002) found that the single most important factor in truck-related accidents was when the
truck driver started the work week tired. Thus, it is important to consider other variables
(such as circadian rhythm swaps and fatigue) than simply how many driving hours or duty
hours a driver has remaining when making FIFO and LIFO decisions.
Heterogeneous: Not all drivers are created equal
Perishability occurs in part due to HOS regulations but also because of a driver’s
abilities. As previously stated, even though truck drivers may have the same hours available,
they may not perform their duties equally. Studies have found that high body mass index
(Wiegand et al. 2009), high blood pressure (Korelitz et al., 1993), and poor physical and
mental shape (Taylor & Dorn 2006) all increase truck driver fatigue and the likelihood of an
accident. In fact, Stoohs et al. (1994) found that obese truck drivers (who have high rates of
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sleep disorders) had a two-fold higher accident rate. Because not all drivers are the same, it
is paramount for drivers to understand their own physical and mental limits.
This research has shown that by switching schedules (daily or weekly) can increase
average daily driving hours but also alters the driver’s schedule quite significantly. There are
three main ways that drivers can switch their schedules: 1) increase the number of driving
periods within a 24 hour period, 2) change the end time prior to the beginning of the 1 am to
5 am provision, and 3) change the preference start time after the 1 am to 5 am provision
requirements are met. Utilizing these methods correctly may result in a daily driving average
increase of 29 percent (see Figure 15). However, these alterations in schedules can have
various negative influences on drivers’ abilities. Research has found that changes in driving
patterns have been shown to create more fatigue and increase the accident rate (Salomon &
Mokhtarian 1997; Mackie & Miller 1978). A recent study by the American Transportation
Research Institute showed that of the surveyed drivers, 66.3 percent indicated more fatigue of
which 27.8 percent indicated much more fatigue due to the HOS change in July of 2013
(Short, 2013). Short found that 20.1 percent of truck drivers adjusted their start times, 15.6
percent adjusted their end times, and 18.9 percent adjusted their overall schedule. With
changes in schedules and circadian rhythm, there is a greater chance of fatigue and possible
accident (Harris 1977). Our results show why schedules are changed.
Long Term Plan
This research revealed two aspects regarding HOS regulations: 1) HOS regulatory
policy is uncertain (see Figure 7), and 2) HOS regulations vary highly with respect to average
daily driving hours that can be achieved based on the different restrictions and provisions
(see Table 4 History of HOS). When there are frequent and large regulatory changes there is
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an increase in investment risk that decreases the probability of company investment (Luo
2004; Holcomb et al. 2014; Short 2013). A decrease in investment occurs when the longterm plan is uncertain, which diminishes investments in higher quality tractors and bettertrained truck drivers; thus, investments in safety will ultimately be postponed (Marcus &
Kaufman 1986). Moreover, attempting to invest in driver training, in such a high-turnover
industry, is risky and economically challenging (Staplin & Gish 2005). Not only are safety
investments postponed, but research has also found that in an uncertain regulatory
environment capital is diverted to lobbying efforts (Rothaermel & Hill 2005).
The number of truck drivers and trucks, as well as the number and location of
distribution centers, rest-stops, and loading docks, are but a few of the elements to consider
when creating a long-term plan. These elements often need time to adapt and stabilize after
regulatory changes are made. The frequent HOS regulatory changes, combined with the
magnitude of change with respect to average daily driving hours disrupts the long-term plan
and destabilizes balance in the trucking industry. For instance, the 1 restart per 168 hours
HOS regulation has reduced the total time that a truck driver can operate from 82 hours to
less than 70-hours per week, a 14.6 percent decrease in truck driver duty hours (FMSCA
2015). Second, shipping routes and distribution centers are often set based on set miles that
truck drivers were capable of driving when that route or distribution center was created.
Changing the capacity of the truck driver influences many logistical functions such as just in
time (JIT) (Tommelein & Li 1999), economic order quantity (EOQ) modelling (Hahm &
Yano 1995; Liao & Chih-Hsiung 1991; Burns & Hall 1985); supply chain management
(SCM) vulnerability and risks (Stecke & Kumar 2009) and many more.
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Conclusions
Overall, this research presented and applied perishable inventory theory and its
associated tactics to the truck driving industry. The applied tactics in this research were
capacity, flexibility, substitution and or elimination, FIFO or LFIO, heterogeneity, and
planning. This research found great capacity differences in the various HOS regulations
based on the exhaustive enumeration method, which may result in less safety due to future
investments and planning in the truck driving industry. This research also found that
restrictions limit the flexibility of truck drivers, which has unintended consequences such as
increased congestion, or avoiding resting when tired; both of which have major safety
implications. Additionally, this research showed how capacity can be increased through
daily and weekly schedule changes, which, based upon the heterogeneity capability of the
truck driver, may have negative safety implications. Further complicating these tactics of
perishability are the frequent HOS changes, which further destabilizes the industry.
Analyzing HOS through the exhaustive enumeration technique and viewing the HOS
regulatory constantly changing regulations through the lens of perishable inventory theory,
HOS regulations have some major negative safety implications to truck drivers currently and
to the truck driving industry in the future. Future unintended consequences can be avoided
by following this researches approach and method prior to implementation of future
regulations.
Limitations and Future Research
As in all studies, there are limitations. The limitations of this study provide potential
future research opportunities. This research provides a theoretical lens and optimization
based on EE. While this approach confirms or supports actual observations of truck drivers
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made by other researchers, truck drivers are not a primary data source for this research.
Truck drivers could and should be asked directly about these perishability concepts and
tactics in future research. Surveys analyzing truck companies and drivers, pre and post HOS
changes, with respect to the concepts of perishable inventory theory could establish greater
credibility for the theoretical foundation presented in this research. Such research would
provide greater insight into and evidence of the actual safety implications of the current
regulatory environment.
Additional research is needed in coalescing regulators and truck industry experts with
respect to safety as part of the field of managerial controls (Miller & Saldanha 2013) and in
order to ensure wiser regulatory policies (Breyer 1986). Moreover, future research should
look at directly measuring driver fatigue, through technologies such as the “sleepalyzer”
(Williams et al. 2012, p.120), so that those direct measurements can be used to develop direct
regulations, instead of indirect regulations that hope fatigued driving does not occur.
Theoretical Contributions
This research has expanded the realm of the theory of research dealing with
perishability by incorporating perishability more broadly into the service sector and
specifically into the truck driving industry. Moreover, by demonstrating that truck drivers’
time is perishable with respect to deterioration (fatigue) and obsolescence due to HOS
regulations, this research has provided ample evidence as to the merit of this theory within
the truck driving industry. This research has brought together tactics from Perishable
Inventory Theory, Perishable Asset Revenue Model, Deteriorating Theory, and Yield
Management and applied them to truck driver’s perishable time. Furthermore, the analysis
found that the regulatory environment is not only currently in a state of change but also the
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changes have dramatic impact on the tactic of capacity for truck drivers. The combination of
these two regulatory challenges may result in safety implications that are explained through
the other tactics of perishability – flexibility, and planning. Truck companies, through other
different tactics of perishability (FIFO and LIFO, substitution and or elimination) may can
increase capacity through proper planning of truck driver’s perishable time. The tactic of
heterogeneity was used to demonstrate that although truck drivers become obsolete at the
same regulated time restrictions (due to HOS regulations), they deteriorate with respect to
their driving skills very differently (due to personal fatigue related factors). From these
tactics for dealing with truck driver’s perishable time, greater clarity is presented to
understanding this very complex problem of how to regulate truck driving in order to
improve motorist’s safety.
Managerial Contributions
This research has shown that the truck driving industry is in turbulent times due to the
frequency of regulatory changes and the magnitude of each change. By understanding and
following the many tactics of perishability, the manager will be able to optimize the average
daily driving hours, service levels, and truck driver safety, whatever regulation happens to be
in place.
Capacity in the truck industry should be at the forefront of any manger or owneroperator. Although optimizing the miles driven may result in the most revenue, it does not
necessarily translate into the most profit. Rather, managers and owner-operators should
consider developing a long-term plan that not only considers equipment and personnel but
also the current regulatory environment and its subsequent impact on their business. Since
the regulatory environment is uncertain, managers should consider reducing their risk by
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outsourcing (i.e., hiring temporary drivers, leasing equipment, and outsourcing maintenance)
rather than making investments directly in these assets that may not amortize. If the
regulatory environment were to become more stable, less risk would be imposed on
managers and owner-operators enabling them to have greater confidence in direct
investments (insourcing) in personnel and equipment.
Managers and owner-operators should also consider that investments can be made in
other areas besides truck drivers and trucks. Investments can be made into assets or
processes that eliminate non-driving time for truck drivers thereby making them more
efficient. Substitution investments can be made into technologies that better enable truck
drivers to accomplish their tasks in a more efficient and productive manner as well as
reducing stress and fatigue. These substitution investments decrease the variability of the
workforce, which in turn enables the tactic of flexibility to flourish. Proportioning the right
amount of flexibility into the system to account for congestion, weather, maintenance and
other factors is improved when processes are streamlined. Unfortunately, some regulations
greatly limit the flexibility of truck drivers’ time. Companies employing truck drivers,
owner-operators, and dispatchers should seek to understand the impact of these regulations
and their negative consequences in order to ensure safe sustainable practices. They should
also realize the capabilities of each driver because they are not all the same and safety is
highly dependent upon their heterogeneous abilities under challenging situations. While
some truck drivers may be able to drive maximum hours and switch weekly schedules (and
circadian rhythms) on a regular basis without experiencing perishability with respect to their
driving skills, other drivers may become perishable after their first 7 hours. Once identified,
these heterogeneous abilities in drivers can be used advantageously by matching drivers to
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certain jobs (using either FIFO or LIFO), thereby maximizing the workforce while
minimizing safety incidents. Truck drivers who have higher abilities may be better used
under the FIFO model ensuring non-obsolescence of their perishable time, based on HOS
regulations, while drivers with lesser abilities can be used under the LIFO model ensuring
their perishability does not result from fatigue.
Legislative Contributions
Policy makers can use the exhaustive enumeration (EE) approach and the theory of
perishable resources, as this research has done, to better understand how new regulations will
affect the industry. The EE approach is low-cost and involves relatively simple calculations
for a single regulation when comparing to existing or previous regulations in order to see the
impact on the truck industry prior to its implementation. Furthermore, this technique will
provide the different capacities, which will illustrate the different consequences and
incentives that may result from the implementation of the regulation; thus, avoiding the
“unintended consequences” that sometimes follows regulation reform. Finally, policy
makers should also consider utilizing the tactics presented in this research to fully understand
the many possible ramifications to safety while regulating truck drivers’ perishable time.
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IV. An Exploratory Study of Hours of Service and its Safety Impact on Motorists
Abstract
In July 2013, the Federal Motor Safety Carrier Association (FMSCA) revised its
Hours of Service (HOS) regulatory policy, which restricts the number of duty and driving
hours a truck driver can operate. The revision changed the unlimited restart provision by
restricting it to 1 restart per 168 hours (1 week) and added that the restart must span two
consecutive 1 am to 5 am periods. Lawmakers suspended these two aspects of the restart
provision in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations act on December 16,
2014 until more analysis was completed on the efficacy of these regulations due to
unintended consequences that allegedly negatively affected motorist’s safety. Countering
truck driver fatigue is an important issue and an extremely difficult task because of the many
confounding aspects that can cause fatigue. The new regulation set forth in July 2013, was
supposed to lessen fatigue and thus reduce accidents caused by truck drivers. The current
HOS regulation was in place for approximately 16 months, producing enough data for a
statistical analysis of its effects on truck driver safety. This research found that by comparing
truck driving safety data prior to the change in July of 2013 (the unlimited restart provision)
to truck driving safety data during the enactment of the 1 restart per 168-hour restriction and
1 am to 5 am provision, that the percent of accidents caused by truck drivers did not
decrease. Furthermore, this research found that the HOS changes implemented on July 1,
2013 have not led to a change in the continuing downward trend in accidents involved and
caused by truck drivers. These results suggest that other factors appear to be linked to
motorists’ safety, rather than the updated HOS regulation.
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Introduction
Trucks are used to haul goods more than any other mode of transportation. In fact,
73.1 percent of value and 71.3 percent of volume of US domestic goods are shipped by
trucks (US Census Bureau 2015). Trucks transport a large portion of US shipped goods, and
truck drivers are responsible for a large number of crashes and fatalities. Pritchard (2010)
found that there are about 5,000 fatal crashes involving trucks per year resulting in social
costs greater than 32 billion dollars. Many of these accidents have been caused by fatigued
truck drivers, which could have been prevented with proper rest and truck driver awareness
(Quan et al. 2015). The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMSCA) has
instituted measures that restrict the driving and duty hours of truck drivers to promote safety
and minimize any negative economic impact on the commercial motor vehicle industry.
FMSCA controls the duty and driving time limits of truck drivers through Hours of
Service (HOS) regulations. HOS regulations restrict the number of hours a truck driver can
operate in order to reduce fatigue related accidents. These regulations have changed over the
years due to regulatory agencies attempting to balance fatigue related accidents and
economic impact (see Table 8). In 2003, FMSCA introduced a restart provision to the HOS
regulations, which allowed truck drivers to reset their duty time log back to zero as long as
they took 34 consecutive hours off duty. In 2013, FMSCA altered the restart provision,
which changed the amount of restarts from unlimited to 1 restart per 168-hours and included
that the 34 cumulative hours off must also occur over two consecutive 1 am to 5 am periods.

97

Table 8 History of Hours of Service Changes
Year Changed

1938

1939

1962

2003

2005

2013

2014

Driving Hours

12

10

10

11

11

11

11

On-Duty Hours

15

N/A

14

14

14

14

12

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

9

8

8

10

10

10

10

Duty Cycle

24

24

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

60 Hour (7-day)

60

60

60

60

60

60

60

70 Hour (8-day)

70

70

70

70

70

70

70

≥8

≥8

≥34

≥34

1 Per 168
Hrs

N/A

≥2

N/A

Max Daily
Work
Off-Duty
Hours

N/A

Break

≥34

Restart

≥34

Number of
Restarts
1 am to 5 am
Sleeper Berths
Split Sleep
Changes

7

4

≥2 hrs

≥8 hrs

≥8 hrs

≥8 hrs

5

1

3

2

1

There have been conflicting claims about the effectiveness of these recent HOS
regulation changes. Some trucking unions and some members of Congress have claimed
negative safety implications due to prolonged traffic congestion during daytime hours and
increased fatigue (Ferro 2014; Short 2013). Conversely, legislative branch members and
research has claimed that the HOS revision has decreased accidents, reduced damage, and
most importantly, saved lives (Ferro 2014; Chen et al. 2015; FMSCA 2010).
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Although it is clear that driver fatigue is dangerous and has been linked to higher
accident rates (Dinges 1995; Mackie & Miller 1978; Williamson & Friswell 2013; Summala
& Mikkola 1994; Zhu & Srinivasan 2011), the effectiveness of HOS regulatory policy on
reducing fatigue and making roads safer is still unclear (Arnold et al. 1997; Min 2009b).
Research has found that many drivers actually begin their driving periods fatigued, indicating
that HOS may restrict the number of operating hours but does not directly reduce fatigue or
ensure alert truck drivers (Abrams et al. 1997).
More specifically, these two restart changes (1 restart per 168 hours restriction and
the 1 am to 5 am provision) that have been suspended, until more research is conducted, are
believed by some to increase accident rates due to shifting truck drivers operational times to
more congested periods (Short & Murray 2014; Ferro 2014; Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration 2011). Congress was set to reevaluate these two suspended restart changes,
on September 30th of 2015 or after FMSCA finishes their studies revealing the HOS 1 per
168-hour restart and 1 am to 5 am provision efficacy.
This research investigates the safety efficacy of the 1 restart per 168-hour restriction
and 1 am to 5 am provision that was enacted in July of 2013 through parametric and nonparametric statistical analysis on accidents involving trucks within the state of Ohio. This
research analyzes Ohio’s accident data involving truck drivers and extrapolates these
findings to the US as a whole. This research compares the accidents involving trucks over
two-time periods: 1) July 2009 to July 2013 – a period prior to the increase in restart
restrictions and 2) July 2013 to July 2014 – a period in which the 1 restart per 168-hour
restriction and 1 am to 5 am provision were in place. Since these are the main aspects of
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HOS regulations that changed between these two-time periods, this research aims to discover
how the restart changes affected truck drivers and their accident rate in Ohio.
The regulatory policy levied on the trucking industry has significant managerial,
governance, and societal implications that may change driving safety for motorists. This
research first details the history of HOS and briefly discusses the most recent changes to
HOS. Then the methodology section provides the details of the analysis that was performed
using the Ohio data followed by a discussion of the relevant findings. Finally, some
concluding remarks and suggestions for future research are presented.

Literature Review
Hours of Service (HOS) Background
Federal Motor Safety Carrier Association (FMSCA) establishes HOS regulations for
truck drivers. These regulations stipulate the maximum duty and driving hours of truck
drivers. Moreover, HOS rules limit both daily and weekly duty and driving hours of truck
drivers. Government agencies have stated that regulation in the trucking industry is important
because of the increased potential of an accident that occurs as truck drivers work long hours
(FMSCA 2015). Previous research has also filled gaps regarding the source of truck driver
accidents. Most of this research has measured the effects of singular restrictions and
accidents involving trucks with respect to fatigue, some examples of effects include: multiday driving patterns (Kaneko & Jovanis 1992), starting fatigue level (M. R. Crum & Morrow
2002), driving hours per day (Hanowski et al. 2009; Soccolich et al. 2013; Williamson et al.
2011), driving time of day (Blower & Campbell 1998), breaks (Chen & Xie 2014a), sleeperberths (Hertz 1988), truck miles (Lyman & Braver 2003; Joshua & Garber 1990; Jovanis &
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Chang 1986), truck driver health (Anderson et al. 2012; Stoohs et al. 1994), and regulation
enforcement improvements due to Electronic On-Board Recorders (Cantor et al. 2009).
These research efforts and others have been influential in changes that have been
made to HOS regulations. The following section provides a historical perspective of some of
these HOS changes.
History of Hours of Service
In an effort to mitigate fatigue-related accidents involving long-haul truck drivers, the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) established HOS regulation in 1938 (“Federal
Register, Volume 65 Issue 85”, 2000). By 1939, regulations restricted truck driving to tenhour increments and mandated rest periods of eight hours between those increments
(“Federal Register, Volume 65 Issue 85”, 2000). The policy was controversial for some
drivers and government officials. A FMSCA (2000) report quotes an ICC official who
objected to the proposed HOS regulation in 1937:
We have no control over the manner in which a driver may spend his time off-duty,
although some of his spare time activities may tire him as much as any work would
do. We can only emphasize, by this comment, the responsibility which is the driver's
own to assure himself of adequate rest and sleep, in the time available for this
purpose, to ensure safety of his driving, and likewise the employer's responsibility to
see that his drivers report for work in fit condition (ICC, 1937).

The HOS policy remained predominantly unchanged for the next 60 years (Hall &
Mukherjee 2008). Subsequent revisions to the policy, which were implemented in January of
2004, made three main changes with respect to time: 1) driving time increased to 11 hour
increments, 2) duty hour restriction changed to a maximum of 14 hours on-duty and 10 hours
off-duty before coming on-duty again, and 3) was provided a 34-hour restart period (Federal
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Motor Carrier Safety Administration 2016). These revisions occurred because there was
“general recognition that the existing rules for the truck industries had been well
implemented before there had been a clear scientific understanding of fatigue causal factors
(e.g., time of day, amount and timing of sleep, time awake, and time on task)” (Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Administration 2003, p.22458). FMSCA brought in experts and relied
heavily on fatigue research in order to update these HOS regulations.
History of the Restart Provision
The 34-hour unlimited restart provision for all commercial motor vehicles was
instituted in 2003 in order to reduce the effect of cumulative fatigue and prevent fatiguerelated crashes. However, FMSCA later found that the 34-hour unlimited restart provision
provided the ability for truck drivers to attain more hours than 70 hours per week, which was
previously not possible because of the 70-hour restriction. The restart enabled truck drivers
to operate 5 days, on a maximum schedule, and take a restart on the 6th day and drive again
on the 7th day, enabling truck drivers to attain approximately 82 hours per 7-day period
(Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 2011). This prompted FMSCA to limit the
restart provision.
Further restart limitations were implemented on July of 2013. The goal of the
changed regulations was to lessen long work hours and decrease fatigue-related crashes and
long-term health problems for truck drivers (Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
2003; Rodriguez et al. 2006; Dingus et al. 2006). The additional restart restrictions included
two main changes: 1) required that the restart restriction time covers from 1 a.m. to 5 a.m. for
two consecutive nights, and 2) limited drivers to 1 restart per 168-hour interval.
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The additional restart restrictions were predicted to further reduce the continuing
downward trend in safety-related accidents by preventing an additional 1,400 crashes, 560
injuries, and 19 deaths per annum (Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 2016).
These two restart provisions were suspended due to growing concerns of unintended
consequences in December of 2014 until September 2015, or until further research was
accomplished providing data on the efficacy of these provisions. The 34-hour unlimited
restart provision was reconstituted in December of 2014.
1 Restart per 168-hours and 1 a.m. to 5 a.m. Provision
One of the major aspects of the HOS regulations is the number of restarts a driver can
utilize. In July 2013, the restart changed from unlimited to only one restart per 168-hour
period. The ability to take more than one restart per 168-hour period provided drivers with
the opportunity to be on duty more hours than the 60 hours per 7 days provision or 70 hours
per 8 days provision. Using unlimited restarts, under the 60-hour provision, a truck driver
could obtain 78.4 duty hours per week. Under the 70-hour provision, using unlimited
restarts, a truck driver could obtain 81.66 duty hours per week. The updated HOS regulation,
which limits a driver to one restart per 168-hour period, decreases the total number of duty
hours to 70 for the 70-hour provision and to 60 for the 60-hour provision. This is
approximately a 16.6 percent reduction for the 70-hour provision, and a 30 percent reduction
for the 60-hour provision.
While more total duty hours within a given driving period has been shown to lead to
more accidents (Cantor et al. 2010; Harris 1977; Soccolich et al. 2013; Wiegand et al. 2009),
no studies have been done on the safety implications of multiple restart periods and its effect
on truck driver fatigue. Since drivers should be the most rested immediately following a
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restart period, it could be assumed that more restarts during a given period may actually
increase driver safety. However, FMSCA limited the restarts to 1 per 168 hours because of
excessive buildup of on-duty hours that can occur before and after a restart is taken, without
sufficient evidence regarding fatigue and use of multiple restarts (Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration 2011; Ferro 2014).
In conjunction with the 1 restart per 168 hour restriction, FMSCA instituted the 1
a.m. to 5 a.m. provision. Previous iterations of the HOS regulation have restricted the
amount of driving and duty time for a truck driver, but regulations have never stipulated the
exact time of day during which the restart time must occur (Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration, 2016).
The 1 a.m. to 5 a.m. provision was adopted by FMSCA due to research indicating that
the most effective sleep occurs at 2 a.m. to 5 a.m., thus ensuring time off during the major
circadian low for the majority of truck drivers (Folkard & Tucker 2003; Dongen & Dinges
2005). Research has also found that sleep at night for daytime workers is better than sleep
during the day for nighttime workers (Lavie 1986; Van Dongen & Mollicone 2014; McCartt
et al. 2000).
By implementing the 1 am to 5 am provision, truck drivers who drive at night may
also switch schedules and begin driving during the day to correspond with the time of the
provision. This may improve safety, because research has found that when removing traffic
density or congestion, driving at night is 10 times as dangerous than during the day for truck
drivers (Lavie 1986; Horne & Reyner 1995). Although night-time driving is dangerous due
to potential for increased fatigue and darkness, day-time driving is dangerous due to
increased congestion.
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Shifting more drivers to the day leads to increased congestion, which has been shown
to impact motorist’s safety. First, increased congestion reduces miles driven, thereby making
drivers operate more daily hours (Kok et al. 2012) and exposing the driver’s to the higher
risks associated with longer days. Second, research has shown that traffic flow was the
single most important factor (more than circadian rhythm) in determining accident rates
(Dingus et al. 2006). Higher disparity of speed differences between vehicle types is a major
reason for increased accident rates, due to the acceleration and deceleration differences
between large and small vehicles in congestion (Chen et al. 2011; Beilock 1995; McCorry &
Murray 1993; Peeta et al. 2005; Neeley & Richardson 2009). Basically, as congestion
increases, the rate of accidents also increases (Kononov et al. 2008). Campbell (1995)
suggested providing greater incentives for truck drivers to operate outside the congested
periods due to increased safety for trucks and motorists. However, FMSCA’s 1 am to 5 am
provision resulted in an incentive to the drive during congested periods (Commerce
Appropriations Act, 2014).
One of the other possible consequences of the 1 am to 5 am was that nighttime drivers
may shift their schedule to minimize the restart period duration and increase operating hours
(Short & Murray 2014; Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 2011). FMSCA also
stated that nighttime drivers will generally migrate to daytime schedules due to family life
and events occurring at home since they do not want to sleep when everyone else is awake
(Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 2011). Shifting schedules has been found to
be a major cause of truck driver fatigue (Åkerstedt et al. 2008; Williamson et al. 2011; RioBermudez et al. 2014; Dongen & Dinges 2005).
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The 1 a.m. to 5 a.m. stipulation also becomes challenging because of the different and
numerous time zones in which truck drivers operate. The restart period time is based on the
truck driver’s home terminal time and not their current location (FMSCA, 2016). For
example, a truck driver from Indiana driving to Nevada is mandated to rest during the restart
period from the Nevada local time of 10 p.m. to 2 a.m. Conversely, a truck driver from
Nevada driving to Indiana is mandated to rest during the restart period from the Indiana local
time of 4 a.m. to 8 a.m., which may no longer span the most effective sleep time (2 am to 5
am). The 1 a.m. to 5 a.m. stipulation becomes even more arbitrary for truck drivers who are
away from their home terminal time for long periods. Also, tracking home terminal times
and local times, especially when crossing multiple time zones, becomes onerous for the truck
driver and becomes the source of potential, accidental record keeping violations.
The safety impact of the 1 restart per 168 hours and the 1 a.m. to 5 a.m. provision to
truck drivers is difficult to discern because of the multiple effects that are occurring that were
previously discussed: a likely increase in truck traffic during congested period, changes in
truck driver circadian rhythm, a possible decrease in driving hours and night-time driving,
and an unknown safety implications of the 1 am to 5 am home terminal time. Unfortunately,
FMSCA adopted the 1 restart per 168 hour restriction and the 1 a.m. to 5 a.m. provision prior
to completing necessary research, which would have greatly aided in understanding the
possible safety implications of changing HOS regulations. Representative Richard Hanna
(Vice Chair for Highways and Transit) stated “The intent is clearly that the study be
completed before the rule is enacted,” at which time the study was anticipated to be
completed approximately one year after the change was ratified (Ferro, 2014).
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Mandated 30-Minute Break Provision
The 30-minute rest break is an additional HOS regulation that was adopted in July of
2013. The 30-minute break was not suspended in December of 2014, and continues to
remain in effect. Although the schedule placement of the 30-minute break has some
flexibility, it must occur within the first 8 hours of driving. In order to count as a 30-minute
break, the truck driver must not be working in any capacity, but can use that time for such
things as eating, resting, or exercising (FMSCA, 2016).
Blanco et al. (2011) researched rest breaks, as part of a FMSCA-sponsored study,
providing the legislative branch the conclusions needed to enact the 30-minute break
provision. They noted that of the 97 drivers monitored, their duty day was comprised of 66
percent driving, 23 percent non-driving work, and 11 percent resting. They also found that
the rate of accidents decreased immediately following the break. However, they also
observed that the rate of accidents were highest at the end of the driving period. Some
research suggests that the addition of the break, which causes the overall duty day to be
lengthened, may lead to more net accidents (Short 2013; Chen & Xie 2014b). This suggests
that some of the benefits of the break are offset by an increase in accidents due to the
extension of the driving period.
Another finding that challenges the 30-minute break provision is the ability to enforce
this regulation (Short, 2013). This rule ensures that the truck is not continually driven, due to
the electronic logbook, but it cannot guarantee that the driver is not performing duty-related
activities. Blanco et al. (2011) found that off-duty breaks were best, but any break that was
different from driving also provided an accident rate reduction.
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Unintended Consequences of Regulatory Policy
Balancing many unique work and lifestyle demands makes a “one-size-fits-all”
approach to regulation difficult. When policies are made in order to curtail a dangerous
event or certain behavior, other unintended problems may arise. Senator Collins stated, “it
has become clear that the rules have had unintended consequences that are not in the best
interest of carriers, shippers and the public” (Patton 2014).
Sometimes regulations intending to reduce fatigue may actually increase it for some
truck drivers. A 2008 report to FMSCA found no evidence suggesting a 2003 rule change
decreased the number of deaths caused by large truck crashes and stated that it may have
actually increased the number of deaths (FMSCA, 2015; Short, 2013; Min, 2009; ATA,
2013; Holcomb, 2014). Simply put, HOS regulation does not ensure well-rested drivers; it
ensures specified off-duty times and driving/duty time limits.
There are three unintended consequences of HOS: 1) a switching from nighttime
driving to daytime driving, 2) an increase in the stress levels of drivers, and 3) a need for
more truck drivers (Ferro 2014; Short & Murray 2014; Brewster & Short 2014; Goel 2014).
Concerning switching schedules, FMSCA (2016) claimed to know of no reason why truck
drivers would change from driving at night to driving during the day. This claim contradicts
recent studies, which found approximately 15 percent of drivers have indeed changed their
schedules by switching from nighttime to daytime driving in order to work within the
regulations (Fender & Pierce 2013). Changing work and sleep times have been shown to
increase fatigue and the rate at which accidents occur (Rio-Bermudez et al. 2014; Åkerstedt
1998; Torregroza-Vargas et al. 2014; Goel 2014).
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In addition to increasing fatigue, changing work and sleep times can increase
physical, emotional, and mental stress levels for drivers (Sando et al. 2010; Chen et al. 2015).
Truck drivers may also become fatigued from financial stress related to restrictive rules that
are enforced by large ($2,750 per incident) fines, or pay decreases due to driving time
limitations (Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 2016; Short 2013; Min 2009a;
Holcomb et al. 2014).
The third unintended consequence of HOS is the need for more truck drivers. More
restrictive HOS changes cause the loss of available man-hours, leading to an increased need
for companies to hire more drivers and cancel or decline shipments (Min 2009b). Newly
hired drivers will not have the same experience or training as existing drivers. This may
increase the rate at which truck drivers cause accidents (Belzer et al. 2014). HOS regulations
create persistent driver training and retention challenges (Belzer et al. 2014). High turnover
reduces driver qualifications and route familiarity, which in turn can decrease safety.
Accident Background
Accidents per mile involving and caused by truck drivers have steadily decreased
over time (Lyman & Braver 2003; Bruning 1989; Robert D Pritchard 2010). In their final
rule, FMSCA (2011) reported crash rates falling well before 2004 and a general downward
trend in Commercial Motor Vehicle (CMV) deaths that rose between 2003 and 2006 and then
dropped in the following years. FMSCA also reported there was another subsequent drop in
driver deaths in 2008, but stated that it could be due to other factors such as a weaker
economy that led to reduced driving, increased seat-belt use, and better training and retaining
of truck drivers. In 1975, truck crashes occurred at a rate of 5.8 per billion miles traveled
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(Martinez 1997) and is now at 1.27 per billion miles traveled (National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration 2016).
Although the overall number of accidents are declining per mile, there is research
indicating the severity of accidents has increased due to size and speed of the trucks (Zhu &
Srinivasan 2011; Duncan et al. 1998). But severity of an accident has not necessarily led to a
higher percentage of fatalities, which is in part due to safety technologies that benefit all
motorists (Kahane 2015). Safety technologies such as airbags (front and side), lane assist,
LIDR, GPS, better maintenance of vehicles, and enhanced brakes are claimed to have saved
over 328,551 lives from 1960 to 2002 (Kahane 2015). In 2014, the NHTSA found that 1,144
lives were saved among passenger vehicles in 2012 due to lane assist technologies. Drivers
may also be receiving better training and awareness on factors leading to accidents such as
fatigue, medication, weather conditions, traffic congestion, enabling higher quality riskmanagement decisions and thus a lower number of accidents caused by truck drivers.
There have been numerous studies approximating the percent of fatigue related truck
accidents: 20 percent (Moonesinghe et al. 2003); 41 percent (The American Automobile
Association Foundation for Traffic Safety 1985); 31 percent (NTSB 1990); 16 to 55 percent
(Chang & Chien 2013). In our research, the percent provided by a FMSCA sponsored study
is used, which showed that fatigue is the main cause of truck-related accidents 13 percent of
time (Craft and Blower, 2007).
Other Changes in Ohio Law
Other factors that may also have an impact on truck accidents during the periods
studied are other changes to laws and regulations for vehicles in Ohio. There are two
regulations that are thus discussed: speed limit changes and distracted driving laws
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implemented during the period studied (2009-2014). In the state of Ohio, House Bill 395
passed increasing speed limits for 607 miles of highways and freeways across Ohio, and also
aligned truck speeds to the same speed as other motor vehicles (Grant 2013). Studies have
found increased crash rates and severity due to increased speeds; studies have also found
large differences in speeds between vehicles correlate to higher crash rates (Aarts & Van
Schagen 2006; Solomon 1964). However, Ohio increased speeds only on major roads. The
speed limit increase in 2011 on the Ohio turnpike saw a decrease in the mean number of
fatalities (Armon 2013). The Crash Risk Curve, developed by Solomon (1964), illustrated
that driving at the median speed had the lowest probability of a crash. Since truck drivers
had lower speed limits than that of motorists, the speed variation on roads was greater and
more unsafe. Since the bill both increased the speed limit for motorists on major roads
(leading to an increase in crash rates) and uniformly aligned speeds for trucks and
automobiles (resulting in a reduction in crash rates), it is reasonable to assume that the speed
limit changes should not have significantly changed crash rates involving trucks over the
periods being studied by this research.
The second law that changed dealt with distracted driving, which has been a major
concern as a causal factor in crash accidents (Dingus et al. 2006; Young et al. 2007). Ohio
passed a texting law in June 2012, which was primary for drivers under 18 and secondary
(meaning that officers cannot cite based only on the texting) for drivers over 18. Since truck
drivers must be over 21 to drive, and research has found that secondary texting laws do not
have an effect on accident rate (Abouk & Adams 2013) this law was not considered in this
research.
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The next section will discuss the approach used to discern the safety efficacy of the 1
restart per 168 hour restriction and the 1 am to 5 am provision aspects of the recent HOS
revisions on the safety of truck drivers in Ohio.

Method
Monthly data from all 88 counties in Ohio were analyzed, providing insight into the
recent changes made to HOS regulation and the associated safety implications on motorist
and truck driver safety. Monthly data was used because the changes to HOS occurred in
July, instead of at the start of the calendar year, January. The state of Ohio is used because of
its timely compilation of motor vehicle statistics available for research and because of Ohio’s
similar population density, roadways, and truck routes that cause Ohio (12.05 crashes per
million people) and the US (11.22 crashes per million people) to also have a similar fatality
rate with respect to large truck crashes (see Figure 18).
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Figure 18 Truck Crash Rate and Population Density for 2012

Although Ohio’s roadways or geography may be unique in the US, it does not present
a problem in extrapolating Ohio’s data because historical data captures any unique geography
or roadway characteristics that may exist in Ohio. Also by analyzing the time in question
(July 2013-June 2014) for Ohio and extrapolating upon that geographic data removes the
element of change that may occur due to time (Saccomanno & Nassar 1997; Khasnabis &
Ramiz-Al-Assar 1989; Gordon 1994). Regressions are created from historical accidents
involving trucks that occurred in Ohio providing a consistent historical percentage, which is
used to approximate the impact of HOS in the US. Data used in Ohio provides information
of HOS impact in the US similar to the extrapolating work conducted by Paddock (1974) and
Vogt and Bared (1998) using road and intersection data from Minnesota and Washington to
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build accident models; and Khattak, Schneider, and Targa (2003) who estimated risk factors
in truck rollovers from police reports from North Carolina from 1996 to 1998.
A total of 60 months of retrospective data are analyzed. Since the HOS regulation
was changed in July of 2013, calendar year data would not measure the correct treatments.
The 12 month span from July 2013 to June of 2014 is named post-HOS data. In order to
avoid seasonality fluctuations in the data, the other 48 months were grouped into four years
starting in July and ending in the June (named pre-HOS data). This provides a total of five
years of data that can be broken down by months, by year, and by pre- and post- HOS. Four
of these five years, or 48 of the 60 months, detail accidents involving trucks regulated under
the unlimited restart provision and 12 months, detail accidents involving trucks regulated
under the 1 restart per 168-hour restriction combined with the 1 am to 5 am provision.
There are nine variables of interest for each month. These variables are: 1) total
fatalities involving trucks, 2) total fatalities caused by truck drivers, 3) percent of fatalities
caused by truck drivers, 4) total injuries involving trucks, 5) total injuries caused by truck
drivers, 6) percent of injuries caused by truck drivers, 7) total property damage accidents
involving trucks, 8) total property damage accidents caused by truck drivers, and 9) percent
of property damage accidents caused by trucks2. This research examined 540 data points
from this 5 year or 60 month period (60 months * 9 variables of interest = 540 data points).

2

Accidents caused by truck drivers were determined by the investigating officer at the scene.
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First, pairwise comparisons were made between the pre- and post-HOS monthly
outcomes of the nine variables of interest. More specifically, for the pre-HOS data, monthly
data averages (4-months of data across four years for each calendar month), standard
deviations, and variances were computed and compared to the same statistical measurements
against the post-HOS monthly data using the paired t-test for injuries and property damage.
For fatality data, parametric assumptions were not met to conduct the paired t-test, so the
non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test was applied (Hollander et al. 2013).
In order to account for any possible downward trend of accidents over the years, these
comparisons were expanded to examine the differences in the variables of interest by year
versus grouping them as pre- and post-HOS. Each year was now considered a treatment in
analysis of the variables of interest to capture differences utilizing parametric and nonparametric testing techniques.
To examine differences between years, Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) testing was
conducted followed by the post-hoc Fisher’s Least Significant Difference (LSD) pairwise
comparison when ANOVA parametric assumptions were met. For the assumptions,
normality was assessed using the Shapiro-Wilks test (Razali & Wah 2011). Constant
variance was assessed using the Bartlett test (Levene 1960); and independence was assessed
via the Durbin-Watson test (Kanlayasiri & Boonmung 2007). Consequently, ANOVA was
appropriate for analyzing injuries and property damage involving trucks or caused by trucks.
Since the fatality data failed the test for normality, the nonparametric Friedman, KruskalWallis, and subsequent post-hoc Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests were used for data relating to
fatalities followed by the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test for pairwise comparisons.
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Finally, utilizing data from the Department of Transportation (DoT) regarding the
same types of accident involving trucks (fatalities, injury, and property damage) from 2002
until 2012 enabled regressions to project US accident types involving trucks for the time
period of July 2013 to June of 2014. Three estimates emerged from each of the regressed
points: 1) the predicted regressed estimate if no HOS changes occurred, 2) the corresponding
projected FMSCA claim estimate, calculated as the estimate if no HOS changes occurred less
the anticipated improvement by type of accident (19 fatalities, 560 injuries, and 1400
property damage), and 3) an estimate for the possible reduction of fatigue related accidents
computed as deducting 13 percent from the estimate if no HOS changes occurred. These
corresponding points were then analyzed against the Ohio extrapolated point, which is
discussed next.
Utilizing the data from Ohio Department of Safety Statistics, accident data was
collected from 2002 through 2012 regarding the same types of accidents (fatal, injury, and
property damage) and modeled as a function of time (year). This regression provided the
estimate of what should have occurred given no change in HOS regulation. This value was
divided by the actual number of accidents, by type of accident, providing a corresponding
percentage that was used to extrapolate the US estimate for the period from July 2013 to June
of 2014. This approach is similar to research used by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) to gain awareness of vehicle weights or safety belt use and their
relationship with fatalities (Kahane 1997).
Confidence intervals on the regression lines describing the relationship of type of
accident over years were used to examine whether or not the above regression estimates
predicted by FMSCA and the Ohio point estimate are within the associated confidence
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bounds. The magnitude of the FMSCA estimates were compared to the total US accidents,
and to the total US accidents that were perhaps caused by fatigue.
Many studies compare the number of accidents to the vehicle miles traveled in order
to substantiate a rate that accounts for the quantity of truck miles on the road (Forkenbrock
1999; Jovanis & Chang 1986; Miller et al. 1991). This could not be accomplished for this
research because it utilized mid-year data (beginning in July and ending in June) where the
VMT is reported on an annual basis. Instead, traffic, toll road (a road that drivers must pay
directly to use), and gas tax revenue data were examined in order to eliminate or reduce
effects from other possible influencing or confounding factors (Downs 1992). In addition,
toll roads break down the vehicle class providing data on the actual vehicles on toll ways,
just as gas tax revenue similarly estimates traffic congestion (Newman & Kenworthy 1989).
All analyses assumed an alpha equal 0.05 level of significance and were conducted
primarily using JMPv11.0 software. Results concerning the analyses of the previously
mentioned 9 variables of interest are presented in the next section.

Analysis
Pre-HOS vs. Post-HOS Analysis
Summary statistics for fatalities are shown in Table 9. Although there was a drop in
fatal accidents from pre-HOS (mean 10.48 and median 10) to post-HOS (mean 9.17 and
median 9.5), this decrease was not statistically significant (p-value=0.309). Incongruously,
fatality accidents caused by truck drivers rose slightly from pre-HOS (mean 3 and median 3)
to post-HOS (mean 3.42 and median 3). However, this increase was also not significant (pvalue=0.586).
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Table 9 Comparison of Pre- and Post-HOS Fatal Accidents
Causation Category

Statistical Category

Mean
Standard Deviation
Median
Mean
Fatal Accidents Caused
Standard Deviation
by Truck Driver
Median
Fatal Accidents
Involving Trucks

PRE HOS (48 Months) POST HOS (12 Months)
July 2009 - June 2013 July 2013 - June 2014
10.48
3.57
10
3
1.79
3

9.17
4.61
9.5
3.42
2.35
3

(Pre vs Post HOS)
P-Value
0.309

0.586

Conversely, paired t-tests (see Table 10 and Table 11 where significant p-values are
shaded) indicate there are significant differences between pre- and post-HOS periods
regarding injury and property damage accidents involving trucks. Total injury accidents
decreased by a mean difference of 51.75 per month (p-value < 0.001). Furthermore, the
mean number of injuries caused by truck drivers decreased by greater than 22 accidents per
month (p-value = 0.007). Additionally, property damage accidents involving trucks
decreased by approximately 240 per month, and by 132 property damage accidents caused by
truck drivers (p-values < 0.001).

Table 10 Injury Accident Analysis
Causation Category

Statistical Category

Mean
Standard Deviation
Median
Mean
Injury Accidents Caused
Standard Deviation
by Truck Driver
Median
Injury Accidents
Involving Trucks

PRE HOS (48 Months)
July 2009 - June 2013

POST HOS (12 Months)
July 2013 - June 2014

293.25
41.68
298.5
152.48
24.39
155

241.5
62.94
241
129.83
28.37
126.5
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(Pre vs Post HOS)
P-Value
<0.001

0.007

Table 11 Property Damage Accident Analysis
Causation Category
Property Accidents
Involving Trucks
Property Accidents
Caused by Truck Driver

Statistical Category

PRE HOS (48 Months)
July 2009 - June 2013

POST HOS (12 Months)
July 2013 - June 2014

Mean
Standard Deviation
Median
Mean
Standard Deviation
Median

1178.04
183.66
1174
701.29
108.82
707

937.83
223.77
937
569
132.83
533

(Pre vs Post HOS)
P-Value
<0.001

<0.001

12-Month Increments Analysis
In order to account more accurately for the general decreasing trend in accidents with
respect to time, the 48-month block pre-HOS was broken down into four periods. Each
period consists of 12 month (July to June) ranging from 2009 to 2013.
Fatal accidents caused by truck drivers were not significantly different from any other
year, based on a Friedman test (p-value = 0.208), nor were fatality accidents (p-value =
0.425) as can be seen in Figure 19.

Figure 19 Fatalities Distribution Caused and Involved with Truck Drivers in Ohio

Table 12 breaks down the fatality data further by providing overall rank and p-value
differences based on the Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests. Ranking similar months across the
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five different periods, and then taking the average rank for that specific period, provides a
means for a nonparametric comparison of the data. The rank differences are the rank of the
reference years subtracted by the contrasted years. Although not statistically significant,
Table 12 reveals that the post-HOS for fatalities involving trucks was on average 0.41 less
than the previous period (p-value = 0.59), but was 0.88 higher in regards to truck drivers (pvalue = 0.25). Fatalities caused by truck drivers, in the post-HOS period, were the second
highest average rank period, but were the lowest in fatalities involving trucks.
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Table 12 Fatalities Involved and Caused by Trucks Contrasted by Year

Fatality Involving a Truck

Reference Year

July 2013-June 2014

July 2012 - June 2013
July 2011 - June 2012
July 2010 - June 2011

Contrasted
Year

Median
Rank
Difference Difference

P-Value

Fatality Caused by Truck
Median
Rank
Difference Difference

P-Value

2012-13

-1

-0.41

0.585

1.5

0.88

0.300

2011-12

-0.5

-1.16

0.127

-0.5

-0.54

0.413

2010-11
2009-10
2011-12
2010-11
2009-10
2010-11
2009-10
2009-10

-1.5
0.5
0.5
-0.5
1.5
-1
1
2

-0.75
-0.79
-0.75
-0.34
-0.38
0.41
0.37
-0.04

0.326

0.5
0
-2
-1
-1.5
1
0.5
-0.5

0.33
0.38
-1.42
-0.55
-0.5
0.87
0.92
0.05

0.703

0.300
0.321
0.663
0.623
0.585
0.623
0.956

0.703
0.064
0.513
0.513
0.230
0.230
0.999

Table 13 and Table 14 depict mean differences between each 12-month period
regarding injuries, and property damage. There were significant differences between means
in the number of accidents of at least some of the 12-month periods (ANOVA p-value <
0.001). Shaded values indicate that the reference year is significantly different from the
contrasted year. The LSD pairwise results suggest a greater mean change between larger
time spans confirming a downward slope of occurrences over time. Consequently, it is more
likely that the post-HOS period is most comparable to the preceding 12-month period. As
such, post-HOS data is not significantly different from the previous 12-month period in terms
of injury, property damage, or total accidents. As an illustration of this point, injuries caused
by truck drivers during the period of July 2013- June 2014, and the previous 12 months
indicates a mean difference of -3.08 at a non-significant p-value of 0.744. When comparing
the July 2013-June 2014 period with the period beginning in 2011 and ending in 2012, the
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mean decreased by 25.42 with an associated significant p-value of <0.009. The two main
concepts from these tables are: 1) there has been a downward trend in accidents involving
and caused by truck drivers and 2) the post-HOS year is not significantly different from the
previous year in terms of injuries, and property damage caused or involved with truck
drivers. The analysis results suggest that HOS did not improve safety more than what had
already been occurring.

Table 13 Injuries Involving and Caused by Trucks Contrasted by Year

Injury Accidents
Involving a Truck
Reference Year
July 2013-June 2014
(Post-HOS)

July 2012 - June 2013

July 2011 - June 2012
0.255

July 2010 - June 2011

Contrasted
Year
2012-13
2011-12
2010-11
2009-10
2011-12
2010-11
2009-10
2010-11
2009-10

Mean
Difference
-10.92
-54.67
-82.92
-58.5
-43.75
-72
-47.58
-28.25
-3.83

2009-10

24.42
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Caused by Truck

0.518
0.002
<.001
<.001
0.012
<.001
0.006
0.098
0.820

Mean
Difference
-3.080
-25.420
-38.420
-23.670
-22.330
-35.330
-20.580
-13.000
1.750

0.151

14.750

P-Value

P-Value
0.744
0.009
<.001
0.021
<.001
0.033
0.002
0.172
0.853
0.122

Table 14 Property Damage Involving and Caused by Trucks Contrasted by Year

Property Damage Accidents
Involving a Truck
Reference Year
July 2013-June 2014
Post-HOS

July 2012 - June 2013
July 2011 - June 2012
0.122

July 2010 - June 2011

Contrasted
Mean
Year
Difference
2012-13
-85.830
2011-12
-288.420
2010-11
-321.000
2009-10
-265.580
2011-12
-202.580
2010-11
-235.170
2009-10
-179.750
2010-11
-32.580
2009-10
22.830
2009-10

55.420

Caused by Truck

0.242
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
0.016
0.655
0.754

Mean
Difference
-46.250
-170.080
-178.170
-134.670
-123.830
-131.920
-88.420
-8.080
35.420

0.448

43.500

P-Value

P-Value
0.290
<.001
<.001
0.003
0.006
0.004
0.046
0.853
0.417
0.320

Percent of Truck Drivers at Fault Analysis
An analysis of percentages rather than actual values associated with truck-related
accidents can yield additional insights. Looking at the percentage of crashes caused by truck
drivers out of the total number of crashes involving trucks provides a better comparison
between years, which may involve differences attributable to features such as highway
technologies, road construction, vehicle safety equipment, traffic congestion, weather, etc.
Since HOS only targeted truck drivers, it would be intuitive that the percentage of truck
drivers at fault would drop due to the added benefit of the safety regulation. Table 15
presents the percentage of truck drivers at fault for fatalities, injuries, and property damages
involving trucks. Across all of these categories, the percentage of accidents caused by truck
drivers increased during this period. This indicates that more truck drivers are responsible
for accidents occurring; however, these trends were not statistically significant (p-value
between 0.113 and 0.247).
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Table 15 Post and Pre HOS Percent Distributions
Accident Type Caused
By Truck Driver

Pre-HOS Mean% (Standard
Deviation)

Post-HOS Mean% (Standard
Deviation)

(Pre- vs Post-HOS Mean)
P-Value

Fatal
Injury
Property Damage

28.28% (13.99% Std Dev)
52.04% (4.45% Std Dev)
58.63% (3.33% Std Dev)

36.72% (23.67% Std Dev)
54.46% (5.43% Std Dev)
60.92% (3.75% Std Dev)

0.114
0.113
0.247

Percentage data were further stratified into the five 12-month periods beginning in
July and ending in June (Table 16). The percentage of truck drivers at fault increased during
the post-HOS period. The post-HOS period has a higher mean across all measures than all
the prior years, however, this difference was only significant for fatalities caused by truck
drivers when compared to the previous year 2012-13 (p-value=0.026).

Table 16 Ohio Percent of Accidents Caused by Truck Drivers Least Significant Difference

Reference Year
Post-HOS
July 2013-June 2014

% Fatality Caused by % Injury Caused by % Property Damage % Total Caused by
Truck
Truck
Caused by Truck
Truck
Contrasted Year
Mean
Mean
Mean
Mean
P-Value
P-Value
P-Value
P-Value
Pre-HOS
Difference
Difference
Difference
Difference
2012-13
13.61
0.026
1.87
0.295
0.92
0.476
1.19
0.304
2011-12
0.9
0.881
2.2
0.220
0.53
0.681
0.79
0.491
2010-11
11.77
0.054
2.46
0.171
1.33
0.305
1.61
0.166
2009-10
7.46
0.217
3.15
0.080
2.38
0.069
2.52
0.031

Ohio Extrapolation to the US Analysis
Extrapolating the Ohio data to the US is important to gain insight on the impact of
HOS across the US and to compare the results to FMSCA’s predictions of 19 lives saved,
560 injuries prevented, and 1,400 property damage accidents avoided. US data used from
2002-2012 provided the regression data needed to estimate what the US should have seen
during the period of July 2013 to June 2014 if the 1 restart per 168 hours and 1 am to 5 am
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was not implemented. These three estimates (fatality, injury, and property damage accidents
involving trucks) are labeled US regression estimate in Table 17 HOS Analysis The
associated FMSCA predictions are subtracted from these predicted estimates providing an
estimate of change that the revised HOS regulations should have achieved. The next column,
labeled Ohio extrapolated point on US fatalities, indicates the change extrapolated from Ohio
based on multiple factors. First, three (fatality, injury, property damage) regressions were
performed on accidents involving trucks in Ohio from 2002 to 2012 providing a regression
estimate for July 2013 to June 2014 period if HOS did not change. Using the actual number
of accidents that occurred in Ohio by type (fatality, injury, and property damage) during July
2013 to June 2014, and dividing it by the regression estimate provided a percent. This
percent was then multiplied by the US regression estimate used earlier. This value is a
prediction, based on Ohio, of the impact that the 1 restart per 168 hour restriction and the 1
am to 5 am provision had on truck-safety in the US. The last column, labeled “US regression
estimate reduced by 13 percent fatigue accidents”, depicts points that are considered what
could be achieved if the 13 percent of fatigue related accidents did not occur. In all cases, the
Ohio extrapolated point for the US indicates safety was not lower than the US regression
point.
Figure 20 HOS Analysis on Property Damage Accidents Involving Trucksillustrates
the example of property damage accidents involving trucks discussed in the previous
paragraph. This figure highlights the close nature of three of the four estimates: predicted
estimate if no HOS change occurred, FMSCA’s prediction estimate on the reduction of
accidents due to the change of HOS, and the Ohio extrapolated estimate. This is important to
note because it shows that the Ohio extrapolated point increased accidents in the US by a
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marginal amount and not decreased them by the marginal amount predicted. Comparing
these three estimates to the possible 13 percent reduction that are currently attributed to
fatigue visually shows that this rule was minimally predicted to reduce fatigue related
accidents among truck drivers.
Table 17 HOS Analysis
US Regression Estimate
US Regression
Reduced by FMSCA
Ohio Extrapolated Point
Estimate
US Regression
Prediction (19 Lives, 560 on US Acidents Involving Reduced by
Estimate
Injuries, 1,400 Property
Trucks
13% Fatigue
Damage)
Accidents
Fatalities Involving Trucks
Injuries Involving Trucks
Property Damage Involving Trucks

3249
72364
197473

3230 (-.58%)
71804 (-.77%)
196073 (-.71%)

3263 (+.43%)
75826(+4.78%)
199873 (+1.21%)

*Data obtained from DoT website for fatalities during years 2002-2012, on June 7, 2014
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2827 (-13%)
62956 (-13%)
171801 (-13%)

Figure 20 HOS Analysis on Property Damage Accidents Involving Trucks

Table 18 further depicts the magnitude of FMSCA’s predictions on reducing fatiguecaused accidents among truck drivers. As previously stated, FMSCA predicted HOS would
reduce US truck-related fatalities by 19, injuries by 560, and crashes by 1,400. When
compared to the aggregate number of US truck-related accidents, the FMSCA predictions
amounts to approximately .5 percent reduction of deaths, injuries, or property damage
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involving trucks. Utilizing the 13 percent of fatigued-caused accidents and the DoT data
from 2012 indicates that truck driver fatigue accounted for 510 fatalities, 13,520 injuries, and
32,890 accidents involving property damage. Reducing these numbers by the predicted
FMSCA predictions results in 491 fatalities (a 3.7 percent reduction), 12,960 injuries (a 4.1
percent reduction) and 31,490 (a 4.3 percent reduction).

Table 18 FMSCA’s Predicted Fatigue Based on HOS Implementation
Column

Deaths
Injuries
Property Damage
*Formula

A
FMSCA (2013)
Predicted Change
Due to HOS

B
DOT Data (2012)

C
% Change

D
E
FMSCA (2013)
Predicted
Incidents Caused Reduced Driver
by Fatigue (13%) Fatigue Incidents

19

3921

0.48%

510

560

104000

0.54%

13,520

1400

253000

0.55%

32,890

=A/B

=13%*B

12.52%
12.46%
12.45%
=D-A

F
HOS Change on
Fatigue

3.7%
4.1%
4.3%
=A/D

Eliminating an Alternative Explanation
To avoid drawing the wrong conclusions about the impact of HOS on driver safety, it
is important to demonstrate that changes to the frequency of accidents are not the result of an
increase or decrease in vehicles on the road. Although there is no data to show how many
vehicles are on all the roads, it is possible to estimate the amount of vehicles driving by
comparing the amount of gasoline and diesel gallons taxed and validating the estimate using
turnpike traffic. Figure 21 depicts the number of gallons taxed from July 2009 through June
2014 for the state of Ohio. During this period, gas purchases decreased by a mere 0.35
percent while diesel purchases increased by 0.64 percent, and total gallons of fuel purchased
increased by only 0.29 percent over the entire 60-month time period. Similarly, vehicles on
the turnpike followed consistent yearly patterns during these 60 months, as depicted in Figure
3. The majority of vehicles on the road are class 1 (low two-axle) followed by class 5 (high
128

5-axle). The peaks (summer) and lows (winter) are the changes in traffic flow that occurs
throughout the calendar year.
When combined, these two classes of vehicles account for 94.5 percent of all
vehicles. Over the 60-month time period, vehicle traffic on the Ohio Turnpike changed by
the following amounts: 0.01 percent decrease in class 1, 0.05 percent increase in class 5, and
0.03 percent increase in all classes. The Ohio Turnpike data reveals that all classes of traffic
changed by a rate corresponding with fuel taxes. Both figures have highs and lows that
indicate the seasonality of driving, which is captured in the analysis by ensuring the same
months (July-June) of the given year remains constant.
Since both figures show that there were only negligible changes to vehicle traffic
between the various 12-month periods and the use of fuel in Ohio, overall changes in traffic
were ruled out as a potential cause of the changes in truck-related accidents and no
adjustments were made to account for them as part of the analysis.
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Figure 21 Ohio Million Fuel Gallons Taxed 2009-2014

Figure 22 Vehicles on Ohio Turnpike 2009-2014
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Discussion
Comparing the accidents involving truck drivers prior to the 1 restart per 168 hour
restriction and the 1 am to 5 am provision to the accidents after the HOS changes indicated a
significant difference for both injuries and property damage. This analysis showed that preHOS injuries caused by or involving truck drivers (both <.001) and property damage caused
by or involving truck drivers (<.001 and .007 respectively) were significantly lower than post
HOS accidents of the same type (See Table 10 and Table 11). However, the difference in
fatalities caused by (p = .589) or involving truck drivers (p-value = .309) were not
significant. At first glance, it is possible to think that the HOS change significantly reduced
the accidents involving truck drivers. However, the significance does not appear to be the
result of the HOS change but rather the steady downward trend of accidents that is
continually occurring.
The trend of accidents involving trucks, as annotated in the literature review, has been
on a continuous decline. This decline is also revealed in the test results shown in Table 13
and Table 14. These tables generally indicated that the reference year is most similar to the
most recent contrasted year. For example, in Table 13, the Least Square Difference (LSD)
between July 2013-June 2014 and the 2012-2013 year had a mean difference of -10.92 (pvalue =.518) for injuries involving trucks and a -3.080 (p-value=.744) for injuries caused by
trucks. As the contrasted year becomes further away with respect to time the mean
difference tends to grown and the p-values become significant: indicating a downward trend
for this type of accident.
Comparing the pre- and the post- HOS data significant differences were found,
possibly implying that the HOS changes reduced accidents involving truck drivers.
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However, the general decreasing trend of the number of accidents involving trucks were
driving the differences and not the HOS regulatory changes. In order to more accurately
account for this general downward trend, the percentage of accidents caused by truck drivers
were analyzed, and the pre-HOS group was divided into four separate years and reanalyzed.
The percent of accidents caused by truck drivers are very different than the number of
accidents caused or involving trucks. The percentage of accidents caused by truck drivers
should theoretically change when new safety technologies, improvements in training, or
beneficial regulations emerge, which only effects truck drivers. Although not significant,
this research found that the percent of truck drivers at fault increased in all three categories:
fatal from 28.28 percent to 36.72 percent (p-value=.114), injury 52.04 percent to 54.46
percent (p-value=.113), and property damage from 58.63 percent to 60.92 percent (pvalue=.247). This percentage increase of truck drivers at fault suggests that the HOS revision
was not beneficial to the safety of truck drivers and motorists on roads with truck drivers.
Separating the pre-HOS into four separate years on the number of accidents
involving and caused by truck drivers indicated no significance difference between the year
the 1 restart per 168 hour restriction and the 1 am to 5 am provision was in place to the
previous year (see Table 13Table 14). This suggests that the number of accidents were
neither increased nor decreased to a significant level due to the HOS change.
Upon further testing the percent of truck drivers at fault for fatalities, injuries, and
property damage accidents by separating the pre-HOS into four years yielded interesting
results. First, there was a significant difference (increase) in the percent of truck drivers
causing fatalities during the 1 restart per 168 hours restriction and 1 am to 5 am provision
from the previous year not under this regulation (p-value=.026 see Table 16). Although this
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same percent was higher than the other contrasted years, it was not at a significant level. The
percent of injuries and property damage caused by truck drivers was also at its highest during
the 1 restart per 168 hours and 1 am to 5 am HOS regulation period, but it was not at a
significant level (with p-values ranging from .069 to .681 see Table 16).
Extrapolating the HOS impact on accidents involving trucks from Ohio to the US
revealed that the accidents for fatalities, injuries, and property damage all were above the
regressed estimate for that time period (see Table 17). This suggests that HOS may not have
reduced fatigue related accidents as FMSCA projected.
This research is unable to determine if the HOS change resulted in the reduction of 19
fatalities, 560 injuries, and 1,400 property damage accidents involving trucks. This is in
large part due to the very small percentage of accidents that occur annually in the US
involving trucks. As demonstrated in the analysis, 13 percent of accidents involving truck
drivers have been attributed to fatigue. This 13 percent translates to 510 fatalities, 13,520
injuries, and 32,890 property damage accidents in the US for 2012 (see Table 18). FMSCA
predicted that HOS would reduce by 4 percent the number of accidents caused by fatigued
truck drivers and reduce by approximately .5 percent the number of total accidents involving
trucks (see Table 18). Although these reductions are not inconsequential, HOS does not
address the other 96 percent of accidents caused by fatigued truck drivers. Given the cost
and challenges of implementing HOS, addressing only 4 percent is problematic and further
research is needed to provide greater results in the reduction of truck driver accidents due to
fatigue.
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Conclusions and Implications
There are many important managerial findings from this research: 1) significant
differences exist between pre- and post-HOS regarding the number of injuries, and property
damage accidents involved and caused by truck drivers but not for fatalities, 2) recent HOS
changes (1 restart per 168-hours restriction and 1 am to 5 am provision) did not significantly
change the continuing downward trend of accidents involving trucks, 3) when analyzed using
12-month periods, post-HOS number of accidents involving or caused by truck drivers is not
significantly different than the prior 12 months in any category, 4) percent of accidents
caused by truck drivers from July 2013 to June 2014 increased for fatalities, injuries and
property damage accidents (p-values between 0.113 and 0.247), suggesting that the HOS
changes (1 restart per 168 hours restriction and the 1 am to 5 am provision) made truck
drivers more likely to be at fault for the accident than the period of July 2009 to June 2013,
which was prior to the change; also, the percent of fatalities caused by truck drivers was
significantly higher (p-value = .026) than the previous year, which was not regulated by the 1
restart per 168 hour restriction and the 1 am to 5 am provision, and 5) the regression analysis
and point estimates show that the US fatalities for the period of July 2013 to June of 2014 (1
restart per 168 hour restriction and the 1 am to 5 am provision) are slightly above the trend
line of accidents in the US. Additionally, this research brings to light the small predicted
impact that FMSCA claims HOS will have on fatigued truck drivers; showing that this
regulation change in HOS was predicted to reduce all accidents involving trucks by less than
1 percent, and fatigue-caused accidents by approximately 4 percent.
Countering fatigue is a difficult, if not impossible, feat for legislators. A “one-size”
fits all approach of HOS will have numerous direct and indirect negative safety effects that
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are difficult to predict. This research has shown that HOS has not decreased the percentage
of accidents caused by truck drivers in the state of Ohio. Furthermore, the rate at which
accidents had previously been decreasing due to other factors did not significantly change
because of the restart restrictions introduced into HOS.
Enacting new HOS regulations came at a great expense to the individuals, the
industry, and ultimately the consumer. In fact, Short (2013) found that 66.3 percent of truck
drivers surveyed were more fatigued and 27.8 percent were much more fatigued due to the
updated HOS restart restrictions. Not only were truck drivers reporting that they were more
fatigued, but daytime traffic congestion has also increased due to HOS requirements, making
roads less safe (Montague 2014; Short & Murray 2014; Downs 1992; Chen et al. 2015)
Better enforcement of other regulations may be a more effective and cheaper
alternative to HOS implementation. For example Craft and Blower (2004) demonstrated that
29 percent of accidents caused by trucks were the result of brake problems on trucks and that
fatigue ranked seventh in terms of risk importance. Improved trucking compliance on brake
safety could have more than double the impact of attempting to counter fatigue. The bottom
line, is when legislation is passed that has questionable effects, more research should be
accomplished prior to its implementation.
Accidents are a terrible tragedy. There are many reasons why accidents occur.
Government HOS regulations need to be well researched prior to implementation. With
respect to the 1 restart per 168 hours restriction and 1 am to 5 am provision, thorough
research was not completed until 1 year after the enactment of the rule (Ferro 2014). The
eventual suspension of these provisions indicates the very real possibility of some unintended
consequences this HOS regulation may have had on truck drivers and motorists. This
135

research has shown that truck drivers within Ohio are not causing a smaller percentage of
fatalities, injuries, or property damage, the exact opposite of the intent of HOS.
Future Research
The data from Ohio is only a sample. Once data is available at the national level, it
too should be explored to better understand the HOS effects on truck driver and overall
motorist’s safety. Additional analysis should be conducted on other possible causal factors
that affect safety that may not be tracked or apparent at this time. For example, high driver
turnover may have resulted from the HOS regulation, and high driver turnover has been
shown to increase accidents due to a decrease in route familiarity and schedule (Staplin &
Gish 2005; Griffin et al. 1992)
Further studies should examine how other career fields are mitigating fatigue and
reducing accidents. For example, the medical field has made numerous improvements to
handle fatigue (i.e., ER doctor and staff shifts), while the airline industry has reduced pilot
fatigue. The effort of these industries has a lot to offer the trucking industry through
benchmarking.
Further research is needed on countering fatigue among truck drivers. Rather than
dealing with actual numbers of accidents, research focusing on percentages will yield fewer
confounding results by ruling out changes driven by market force innovations that equally
affect truck drivers and other motorists. Additional research can also be conducted by
expanding the timeframe to the entire period that the 1 restart per 168 hours and 1 am to 5 am
provision was in place, providing greater numbers and clarity to its impact on truck drivers’
safety.
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VI. Conclusions and Recommendations
This chapter presents the main findings from this research. Implications and
recommendations are then provided based on the conclusions of this research. This section
will also address specific implications to the Air Force.

Research Conclusions and Air Force Implications
The first research objective was to discover if HOS regulation was different from the
other safety regulations examined. A typology construct was created to classify these
regulations and to examine the differences in the types of regulations. HOS regulation was
found to be the only safety regulation studies as the objective-indirect type. No regulations
studied moved from direct to indirect or indirect to direct, but since the majority of
regulations are classified as direct it would seem that this type of regulation is preferred.
Since HOS is regulating a factor related to fatigue but not fatigue itself, it makes more sense
why this regulation is continually changed. This regulation substantially changed on average
every 7.09 years. This was statistically more frequent than changes to subjective-direct (p
value .003) policy type. In the event that a technology came out that could measure driverfatigue, hours of service regulation may become direct. Until that time, it is very likely that
more HOS regulatory reform will continue in an attempt to indirectly regulate fatigue.
The other regulations that were examined primarily started as subjective-direct and
ended as objective-direct. If a change occurred, subjective-direct regulation types moved to
objective-direct 28.5 percent of the time, and only moved back 3 percent of the time (due to a
unique situation); leading to 7 of the 11 initially subjective-direct type ending as an objective137

direct type. This implies that objective regulations seem to be preferred to subjective
regulations.
This typology was also empirically tested and significant differences were found
among the various types. Subjective-direct regulations types (19.67 years) changed
significantly less frequently than objective-direct types (13.67 years) and objective-indirect
types (7.09 years). There was also a statistical difference among the size (characters, and
sections) of the different types of regulation. Of the three types classified in this research, all
were significantly different (p-value <.0001). Subjective regulations were the smallest,
which could be explained by lack of regulation needed to describe intent rather than
enforceable procedures. The objective-indirect type was substantially larger than either
objective-direct or subjective-direct types. Since there are many indirect factors that
contribute to the problem, indirect regulations may naturally grow in size to attempt to
control these many factors.
The implications of the second chapter are far-reaching due to the practical typology
created. Managers, legislators, and government agencies can benefit from understanding the
different classifications while creating or modifying rules and regulations. Creating only
subjective rules may most likely lead to less control and ambiguous policies, while creating
objective regulations may lead to greater control and clearer policies. Indirect policies may
lead to more changes over time and more complex regulations. In creating rules and
regulation it would appear that some initial subjectivity is needed to provide the intent and
goal, while the majority of the regulation should seek to be objective to provide more legal
clarity and to utilize emerging technologies.
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This understanding of regulation types would benefit the Air Force and the entire
DoD. When writing or reviewing Air Force Instructions (AFIs), it is important to consider
the instruction type. If the instruction is direct or indirect and objective or subjective it will
have varying levels of impact on Airmen. Indirect instructions may most likely not solve the
problem and may create unforeseen or unsafe situations. This may occur since the AFI is
attempting to control only an associated factor of the problem, leaving other factors with no
instruction. Direct instructions provide the safety needed for all Airmen, especially those
who are less experienced and need guidelines in order to ensure their safety. As previously
stated, when a direct type of instruction is followed it provides guidance that leads to safer
operations. However, AFIs should also include some subjectivity. This provides the overall
goal of the instruction, which is beneficial when situations arise that are unique that are not
specifically covered in the AFIs. However, the majority of the instruction should be
objective regulations that can be easily followed. This will not only provide the overall goal
but also the parameters necessary to ensure mission accomplishment and safety.
The third chapter moved to further expand the knowledge with respect to the
incentives provided to truck drivers through the lens of perishable inventory theory and its
associated tactics. The applied tactics in this research were capacity, flexibility, substitution
and or elimination, FIFO or LIFO, heterogeneity, and planning. This research found great
capacity differences in the various HOS regulations based on the exhaustive enumeration
method, which may result in less safety due to future investments and planning in the truck
driving industry. This research also found that restrictions limit the flexibility of truck
drivers, which has unintended consequences such as increased congestion, or avoiding
resting when tired; both of which have major safety implications. Additionally, this research
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showed how capacity could be increased through daily and weekly schedule changes, which,
based upon the heterogeneity capability of the truck driver, may have negative safety
implications. Further complicating these tactics of perishability are the frequent HOS
changes, which further destabilize the industry. Analyzing HOS through the exhaustive
enumeration technique and viewing the HOS regulatory constantly changing regulations
through the lens of perishable inventory theory, HOS regulations have some major negative
safety implications to truck drivers currently and to the truck driving industry in the future.
Future unintended consequences can be avoided by following this researches approach and
method prior to implementation of future regulations.
The Air Force may be able to manage Airmen based on the tactics of perishable
inventory theory. For example, the Air Force attempts to manage fatigue like FMSCA by
limiting the hours a pilot can be on duty. There are 24-hour period, 7-day period, 30-day
period, and 90-day period restrictions on the amount of hours a pilot can operate. Different
types of aircrafts have different rules (single seat versus crew aircraft). For example, pilots
in two different crew aircraft (C-130 and the KC-135) experience the same flight hour
restrictions, but very different fatigue levels. The KC-135 refueled other aircraft, making the
mission much less stressful because it entailed a takeoff, orbit, multiple refueling, and a
landing. Although there may be eight flight hours (the value used in the 24-, 7-, 30-, and 90day restrictions) accumulated in a 12-hour duty day, it was not as fatiguing as the C-130
mission. In a C-130 mission, there were multiple combat takeoffs (wearing of helmets and
protective armor), combat landings, unloadings, reconfigurations, and reloadings. In a
similar 12-hour duty day a pilot may only achieve 5 hours of flying. Since the limitations are
based on flight time, it would appear that the pilots of the KC-135 would be much more
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fatigued than the pilots of the C-130. However, this is not the experience of many pilots.
Fatigue is much more complicated than just the flight hours recorded. McClelland’s research
(2013) also drew the same conclusion, which he found that flight time is not the right
approach to understanding fatigue.
Reevaluating how the Air Force manages people with respect to fatigue is a
complicated and incredibly important issue. Given that Airmen operate expensive
equipment, performing risky operations, and can have large impacts on international
relations; it is critical that they are not fatigued while performing these duties. This research
has shown that indirect measures, such as flight-time, can lead to operators being in
compliance, but still failing by being fatigued.
The fourth chapter researched the safety efficacy of the recent HOS change. The
research in this chapter found: 1) Significant differences exist between pre- and post-HOS
regarding the number of injuries, and property damage accidents involved and caused by
truck drivers but not for fatalities, 2) Recent HOS changes (1 restart per 168-hours restriction
and 1 am to 5 am provision) did not significantly change the continuing downward trend of
accidents involving trucks, 3) When analyzed using 12-month periods, post-HOS number of
accidents involving or caused by truck drivers is not significantly different than the prior 12
months in any category, 4) Percent of accidents caused by truck drivers from July 2013 to
June 2014 increased for fatalities, injuries and property damage accidents (p-values between
0.113 and 0.247), suggesting that the HOS changes (1 restart per 168 hours restriction and
the 1 am to 5 am provision) made truck drivers more likely to be at fault for the accident than
the period of July 2009 to June 2013, which was prior to the change; also, the percent of
fatalities caused by truck drivers was significantly higher (p-value = .026) than the previous
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year, which was not regulated by the 1 restart per 168 hour restriction and the 1 am to 5 am
provision, 5) The regression analysis and point estimates show that the US fatalities for the
period of July 2013 to June of 2014 (1 restart per 168 hour restriction and the 1 am to 5 am
provision) are slightly above the trend line of accidents in the US. Additionally, this research
highlighted the small predicted impact that FMSCA claims HOS will have on fatigued truck
drivers; showing that this regulation change in HOS was predicted to reduce all accidents
involving trucks by less than 1 percent, and fatigue-caused accidents by approximately 4
percent.
The Air Force could gain insight from this research by conducting similar types of
analysis on safety outcomes in aircraft when the AFIs change or when there are waivers. For
example, the Air Force waived the 30-day flight-time to allow more flight hours during
Operation Iraqi and Operation Enduring Freedom. The safety results before and after this
waiver was implemented, would provide information to the Air Force regarding this flight
duty period restriction as well as the sensitivity to changing these hours and associated safety
implications. Variables such as mishaps (class a-d), and in-flight emergencies should be
analyzed before and after the flight-time waiver was established. Additional research should
examine the safety differences between aircrafts and jobs based on factors that are related to
fatigue, which may not be addressed in the AFIs.
Summary
The Air Force relies on the truck industry to deliver the logistical capabilities to ports,
airfields, and rail-stations in order to deliver the needed resources to those in combat.
Restricting the capability of truck drivers will also restrict the capability of delivering this
logistical capability to our Airmen in combat. Furthermore, the Air Force is dependent on
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funding that is generated by the economy, which is largely reliant on the fiscal health of the
trucking industry. Therefore, a weak truck industry will have negative impacts to the
economy, which means a weaker Air Force.
Countering fatigue indirectly is a difficult, if not impossible, feat for legislators.
Attempting to regulate fatigue indirectly will lead to a continually changing regulatory
environment that will have consequences on the trucking industry, the supply chain, and the
economy. The trucking industry will continually adjust the number of drivers and associated
support structure in order to provide a certain service level. These changes may have
negative safety implications and the supply chain will have to adapt to changing delivery
times and number of warehouses. The economy, given that 1 in 15 people work in the
trucking industry (All Trucking 2016), will be impacted by these regulatory changes, which
is why it is critical to get it right.
This research provides more insight on how to get HOS regulation to offer more
safety to truck drivers and motorists. It is important that this regulation is directly measuring
its intended goal—fatigue. Moreover, by measuring fatigue instead of hours of operation, the
many different unintended consequences (safety and economically), which this research
found, may be avoided.
Future Research
Given the new regulation typology proposed by this research, there is a plethora of
future research needed to either further substantiate it or find its weaknesses in different
fields. Additional research can be conducted on different characteristics of the types
discussed in this research. Some of these include the efficacy of the regulation or rule to see
which regulations tend to provide better results regarding their intended objective. Other
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characteristics such as cost could be explored in order to provide a better cost-benefit of
different regulation types.
Truck drivers could and should be asked directly about these perishability concepts
and tactics in future research. Surveys analyzing truck companies and drivers, pre and post
HOS changes, with respect to the concepts of perishable inventory theory could establish
greater credibility for the theoretical foundation presented in this research. Such research
would provide greater insight into and evidence of the actual safety implications of the
current regulatory environment.
Additional research is needed in coalescing regulators and truck industry experts with
respect to safety as part of the field of managerial controls (Miller & Saldanha 2013) and in
order to ensure wiser regulatory policies (Breyer 1986). Moreover, future research should
look at directly measuring driver fatigue, through technologies such as the “sleepalyzer”
(Williams et al. 2012, p.120), so that those direct measurements can be used to develop direct
regulations, instead of indirect regulations that hope fatigued driving does not occur.
The data from Ohio is only a sample. Once data is available at the national level, it
too should be explored to better understand the HOS effects on truck driver and overall
motorist’s safety. Additional analysis should be conducted on other possible causal factors
that affect safety that may not be tracked or apparent at this time. For example, high driver
turnover may have resulted from the HOS regulation, and high driver turnover has been
shown to increase accidents due to a decrease in route familiarity and schedule (Staplin &
Gish 2005; Griffin et al. 1992)
Further studies should examine how other career fields are mitigating fatigue and
reducing accidents. For example, the medical field has made numerous improvements to
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handle fatigue (i.e., ER doctor and staff shifts), while the airline industry has reduced pilot
fatigue. The effort of these industries has a lot to offer the trucking industry through
benchmarking.
Further research is needed on countering fatigue among truck drivers. Rather than
dealing with actual numbers of accidents, research focusing on percentages will yield fewer
confounding results by ruling out changes driven by market force innovations that equally
affect truck drivers and other motorists. Additional research can also be conducted by
expanding the timeframe to the entire period that the 1 restart per 168 hours and 1 am to 5 am
provision was in place, providing greater numbers and clarity to its impact on truck drivers’
safety.
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